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I. INTRODUCTION
What distinguished premodern from modern American juris-
prudence? Whereas most commentators agree that the transition
from premodernism to modernism occurred around the Civil War,'
* Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Tulsa. I thank Paul Finkelman,
Thomas C. Grey, Robert W. Gordon, Tony Sebok, Jim Mooney, Mark Tushnet, Marty Belsky, and
Bill Hollingsworth for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also appreciate the financial
support of the Faculty Summer Research Grant Program of the University of Tulsa College of
Law.
1. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal
Thought: The Significance of the Warren Court, in Bernard Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A
Retrospective 324, 329 (Oxford U., 1996) (stating C.C. Langdell's appointment as Harvard's first
dean in 1870 marks the beginning of legal modernism). The following sources provide helpful
historical accounts of American jurisprudence, the legal profession, and legal education. Jerold
S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (Oxford U., 1976);
Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (Harvard U., 1974); Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American
Jurisprudence (Clarendon, 1995); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Simon &
Schuster, 2d ed. 1985); Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (Yale U., 1977); Kermit L.
Hall, The Magic Mirror (Oxford U., 1989); James E. Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970:
A History (Rice U., 1990); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860
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recent writings reveal dissension regarding the nature of antebellum
and postbellum jurisprudence. In a wonderfully detailed study of
Christopher Columbus Langdell, his jurisprudence, and his case
method of teaching, William P. LaPiana argues that a defining feature
of Langdell's postbellum legal science was a positivism that contrasted
with a natural law orientation characteristic of the earlier antebellum
jurisprudence. 2 In a provocative critical essay, Robert W. Gordon
argues to the contrary: LaPiana's emphasis on natural law during the
antebellum period is exaggerated and misleading, while his stress on
the positivism of postbellum legal science is "incomplete and over-
broad."3
Gordon does not maintain that LaPiana totally misses the
mark; rather, LaPiana's mistake is one of degree. Gordon acknowl-
edges that Langdellian legal science was positivist and that antebel-
lum jurisprudents often were natural law theorists. Nevertheless, to
Gordon, postbellum positivism and antebellum natural law were not
features central to understanding the respective eras. Rather, Gordon
finds that the postbellum period was most strongly defined by
"generalizing ambitions to produce.., a 'philosophically arranged'
body of law, a rational scheme or system of abstract categories for
organizing legal knowledge."4 The antebellum period was distin-
(Harvard U., 1977) ("Horwitz r); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-
1960 (Oxford U., 1992) ("Horwitz Ir); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (U. of
North Carolina, 1996); J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Clarendon, 1992);
Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (U. of Chicago, 1960); Perry Miller, The Life
of the Mind in America (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of
Democratic Theory (U. of Kentucky, 1973); Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court
(Oxford U., 1993); Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the
1980s (U. of North Carolina, 1983); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change
1815-35 (Macmillan, 1988); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies in America
70 (U. of North Carolina, 1983); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 787 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1983); M.H.
Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95
(1986); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness, in Rita J.
Simon and Steven Spitzer, eds., 3 Research in Law & Sociology 3 (JAI, 1980); Eben Moglen,
Holmes's Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2027 (1995) (reviewing
Owen M. Fiss, 8 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the
Modern State, 1888-1910 (Macmillan, 1993)); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery
Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
513 (1974); Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 Perspectives in
Am. Hist. 405 (1971).
2. William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience 5 (Oxford U., 1994).
3. Robert W. Gordon, The Case For (and Against) Harvard, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1231, 1236
(1995) (reviewing LaPiana, Logic and Experience (cited in note 2)).
4. Gordon, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 1236 (cited in note 3) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Codes, and the Arrangement of Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1870)).
[Vol. 50:13871388
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guished by jurisprudential "considerations of policy or 'convenience,'
the functional needs of a commercial society."5 LaPiana, too, recog-
nizes the formalistic conceptualism of the postbellum era and the
policy-oriented judicial decision making of the antebellum era, but he
subordinates these factors to positivism and natural law during each
respective period.
In this Article, I explain and resolve the disagreement between
Gordon's and LaPiana's narratives of premodern and modern nine-
teenth-century American jurisprudence. To do so, however, the cru-
cial differences between premodernism and modernism in general
need be set forth.6  A distinctive feature of premodernism was an
abiding faith in nature or God as a stable and foundational source of
meaning and value. Individuals and societies seemed to belong to,
rather than exist separately from, nature and God. Because of this
metaphysical unity, human access to meaning and value always re-
mained immanent in ourselves and in the world. Hence, humans
5. Id. at 1252. See Gilmore, The Ages of American Law at 19-40 (cited in note 1)
(describing the general advancement of American law in the antebellum era); Horwitz I at 2
(cited in note 1) (noting that judges began to frame legal arguments in terms of "the importance
of the present decision to the commercial character of our country" and the importance to "our
commercial code").
6. Some sources that helpfully discuss the transitions from premodernism to modernism
include the following: Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectiviem and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (U. of Pennsylvania, 1983); Louis Dupr, Passage to Modernity (Yale
U., 1983); Karl LMwith, Meaning in History (U. of Chicago, 1949); Richard H. Popkin, The History
of Scepticism From Erasmus to Spinoza (U. of California, 1979); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature (Princeton U., 1979); Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind
(Harmony, 1991); Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Macmillan,
1990); Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (U. of Chicago, 1952); Stephen A. McKnight,
Voegelin's New Science of History, in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern
Mind 46 (Lousiana State U., 1991).
One can distinguish premodernity from premodernism, modernity from modernism, and
postmodernity from postmodernism. See, for example, Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity at 6 (cited in note 6) (distinguishing modernity from modernism). Such a
distinction, for example, can be based on the association of modernism with culture, and the
association of modernity with social, political, and economic arrangements. Such distinctions,
however, often collapse as cultural and social practices conjoin. Compare Steven Connor,
Postmodernist Culture 43-50 (Basil Blackwell, 1989) (focusing on postmodernity and
postmodernism); Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship
and Judicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas
Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1046, 1046 n.2 (1994) (discussing postmodernity and
postmodernism); David A. Hollinger, The Knower and the Artificer, with Postcript 1993, in
Dorothy Ross, ed., Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, 1870-1930, at 26 (Johns Hopkins
U., 1994) (focusing on the ambiguity of the term modernism); Dorothy Ross, Modernism
Reconsidered, in Dorothy Ross, ed., Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, 1870-1930 at 1
(Johns Hopkins U., 1994) (offering distinctions between different forms of modernism and
modernity).
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seemed capable of directly accessing and knowing eternal and univer-
sal principles that arose from or within nature or God.7 The supposed
existence of these principles led to distinctive conceptualizations of the
temporal, so that time or history had to harmonize with the idea of the
eternal and universal. In a first stage of premodernism, time was
understood to be cyclical. Civilizations would rise and fall, but the
eternal and universal principles remained intact; societal history
amounted to recurrence.8 The notion that humans and societies might
progress endlessly was foreign to premodern thought. In a second
stage of premodernism, though, history became eschatological, pro-
gressing toward a goal.9 The concept of premodern progress, however,
was limited and not completely within human control. Progress was
understood as a movement toward the perfect realization of the eter-
7. Louis Dupr6 writes:
The modern question-whether intelligibility is grounded in the structure of the real or
imposed by the mind--could not occur to early Greek thinkers, since both mind and
reality participated in the same intelligibility. Contrary to later idealism, intelligibility
resides primarily in the kosmos; the mind only participates in it.
Dupr6, Passage to Modernity at 23 (cited in note 6). See Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity at 67-68 (cited in note 6) (suggesting that the rational order of nature
revealed and reinforced the rational order of human society).
8. See generally Stow Persons, The Cyclical Theory of History in Eighteenth Century
America, 6 Am. Q. 147 (1954) (focusing on the cyclical theory of history in late eighteenth-century
America). Barbara Adam writes that, in this premodern conception, "nothing new enters the
cycles of endless transformations." Barbara Adam, Time and Social Theory 85 (Temple U.,
1990). Karl Lkwith explains:
According to the Greek view of life and the world, everything moves in recurrences, like
the eternal recurrence of sunrise and sunset, of summer and winter, of generation and
corruption. This view was satisfactory to them because it is a rational and natural
understanding of the universe, combining a recognition of temporal changes with periodic
regularity, constancy, and immutability. The immutable, as visible in the fixed order of
the heavenly bodies, had a higher interest and value to them than any progressive and
radical change.
Liwith, Meaning in History at 4 (cited in note 6). See Robert Scoon, The Rise and Impact of
Evolutionary Ideas, in Stow Persons, ed., Evolutionary Thought in America 4, 7-8 (Yale U., 1956)
(explaining how Platonism and Aristotelianism were in tension with an evolutionary approach).
This cyclical view of history was evident in Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War.
But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have
happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order
of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be
satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard
and forgotten.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Benjamin Jowett, trans.), in Francis R.B. Godolphin, ed., 1
The Greek Historians 567, 576 (Random House, 1942).
9. On the development of an eschatological view of history, see LUwith, Meaning in
History at 1-19, 60-61 (cited in note 6); Voegelin, The New Science of Politics at 107-32 (cited in
note 6); McKnight, Voegelin's New Science of History, in Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Significance
for the Modern Mind at 59, 66 (cited in note 6).
1390
1997] ONSET OF POSITIVISM 1391
nal and universal (natural or religious) principles in an otherwise
changing and unstable world. 10
When premodernism gave way to modernism, the commitment
to foundationalism remained intact: Modernists believed, and still
believe, that knowledge ought to, and indeed must, be firmly grounded
on an objective foundation. A crucial distinction between modernism
and premodernism, however, lay in their respective ideas of founda-
tions. Whereas premoderists readily accepted God and nature as
foundational sources for value and knowledge, modernists rejected
religious, natural, and other traditional footings and thus searched for
some alternative foundation or Archimedean point." Indeed, modern-
ism shattered the metaphysical unity of the premodern world and
replaced the unity with a duality: An autonomous and independent
subject or self suddenly stood apart from an objective world. 2
Epistemological problems therefore became central to modernist
philosophy and thought. Knowledge was no longer immanent in our-
selves and in the world. Instead, in order to gain knowledge, the
10. G. Edward White refers to this premodern conception of progress as reflecting a
"prehistoricist sensibility:' White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-35, at 360
(cited in note 1). For an outstanding discussion of the transformation of the concept of history
from premodernism to modernism, see L6with, Meaning in History at 1-19, 60-61, 207 (cited in
note 6).
11. See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism at 16-17 (cited in note 6) (noting
that it is the modem "philosopher's quest to search for an Archimedean point upon which we can
ground our knowledge"); Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal
Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective at 325-29 (cited in note 1).
Compare Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology 129, 139 (Oxford U., 1946) (relating the growing disenchantment of
the Western world with its increasing rationalization); Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of
Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law,
16 L. & Soc. Inquiry 205, 208 (1991) (discussing Weber's views). Nonetheless, some early
modernists, such as Descartes and Newton, still saw their insights as related to religion. See
Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza at 189-91 (cited in note 6) (describing
Descartes's continuing belief in God); Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind at 269-90 (cited in
note 6) (describing Newton's impact on theology and philosophy). Broad transitions, such as
from premodernism to modernism, are often due as much to political, cultural, and religious
developments as to purely intellectual concepts. For example, there is a complex relation
between religion and the development of modernism. In particular, the Reformation helped
generate the modernist view that tradition can and should be questioned since the Reformers
attacked the traditional authority of the Catholic Church. See id. at 233-47 (discussing the
impact of the Reformation on Europe). See generally Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of
Jurisprudence (U. of Pennsylvania, 1989) (arguing that jurisprudential theory should be
understood within its historical, political, and social contexts); Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity (cited in note 6) (emphasizing the historical and political context in telling
the story of the development of modernist philosophy).
12. On the emergence of an independent reality or nature, see Dupr6, Passage to Modernity
at 178 (cited in note 6).
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subject needed somehow to bridge the gap between itself and the
objective world. Traditional beliefs appeared as obstacles on this
bridge and thus were persistently doubted-denigrated as mere
prejudices-and often had to be discarded before truth could shine.
13
Transitions among different stages in modernism emerged as
modernist thinkers struggled in various ways to overcome the central
epistemological difficulties. For example, during the first
stage-rationalism-pure reason or logic seemed to yield knowledge,
while during the second stage-empiricism-sense experience seemed
to yield knowledge.1
4
Partly on account of the metaphysical differences between
premodernism and modernism, the concept of progress drastically
changed. During the second stage of premodernism, the concept of
progress developed within a metaphysically unified world: Progress
denoted movement toward the perfect realization of eternal and uni-
versal principles. In the context of the metaphysical duality of the
modernist world, though, progress became limitless and a matter of
human ingenuity. The modernist self asserted an ostensible power to
control the external world and social organization. With the modern-
ist repudiation of religious and traditional beliefs, the social order no
longer appeared predetermined or immanent. As Zygmunt Bauman
observes, modernist society was like a garden: Humans rationally
designed and cultivated it, nurturing some plants while eliminating
others (the weeds). 5 Thus, a "historicist sensibility" emerged: Be-
13. See generally Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism at 127-30 (cited in note 6);
Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza at 172-248 (cited in note 6); Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature at 42-43 (cited in note 6); Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity at 91, 178-89 (cited in note 6). Thomas Grey eloquently summarizes the
epistemological problem of modernism:
[Human knowledge of an objective, material and external world must somehow be built
up from subjective and immaterial impressions and ideas occurring in an internal and
intangible mental medium. How this is to be done is the "problem of knowledge," to be
solved by the special philosophical sub-discipline of "epistemology"; epistemology in turn
is built upon an ontology that divides the world into mind and matter ....
Grey, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 796 (cited in note 1) (citation omitted).
14. Elsewhere, I identify, in addition, third and fourth stages in modernism. The third
stage is transcendentalism, when the specification of the various conditions or processes neces-
sary for our experiences and institutions seems to yield knowledge. I call the fourth stage late
crisis-when rationalism, empiricism, and transcendentalism all seem to fail, then anxiety,
anger, despair, and an increased degree of creative complexity result. See Feldman, From
Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court
A Retrospective at 325-29 (cited in note 1).
15. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust 65, 70, 73, 91-92, 113-14 (Cornell U.,
1989). Modernism, perhaps presumptuously, "boasts the unprecedented ability to improve
human conditions by reorganizing human affairs on a rational basis." Id. at 65. Bauman adds
that "the modern world [is] distinguished by its ambition to self-control and self-administration."
Id. J.M. Kelly writes of the Enlightenment, in particular, that "the dominant note was one of
[Vol. 50:13871392
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cause of human willpower and creativity, the world could continually
improve.
16
These general conceptions of premodernism and modernism
facilitate an understanding of the transition from premodern to mod-
ern American jurisprudence. In American legal thought, the crucial
distinction between the antebellum (premodern) and postbellum
(modern) periods was the opposition between natural law and positiv-
ism. 7 Nevertheless, natural law and positivism were not the defini-
tive components of the respective eras. In other words, Gordon cor-
rectly asserts that before the Civil War, a practical policy-oriented
approach to decision making was at least as important as natural law,
and that after the Civil War, formalistic conceptualism was at least as
important as positivism. Nonetheless, as LaPiana suggests, the most
basic and significant dissimilarity between the two eras lay in the
difference between natural law and positivism. Most important for
my purposes, the opposition between natural law and positivism
marks the respective periods as premodern and modern. Antebellum
legal science was premodern because it retained a faith in natural law
principles as the foundation of the common law system and the ulti-
mate source of legal knowledge. Postbellum Langdellian legal scien-
tists repudiated this premodern faith and instead began the character-
istically modernist quest for an Archimedean point, a new ground for
legal knowledge.
profound scepticism towards traditional systems of authority or orthodoxy (especially those of
religion), and a strong faith in the power of the human reason and intelligence to make unlimited
advances in the sciences and techniques conducive to human welfare." Kelly, A Short History of
Western Legal Theory at 249-50 (cited in note 1). Compare Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity at 67-69 (cited in note 6) (discussing the significance of natural and social
order in understanding premodernity and modernity); Feldman, From Modernism to
Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective
at 326 (cited in note 1) (discussing the emergence of the modernist idea of human control over
society); McKnight, Voegelin's New Science of History, in Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Significance
for the Modern Mind at 57-61 (cited in note 6) (discussing Voegelin's critique of the self-
representation of modernism, including the human control over destiny).
16. See White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815.35 at 6 (cited in note 1)
(noting the "lack of a historicist sensibility" during the 1820s). White writes that historicism is
"a stance which assumes that qualitative change is a given in the course of nations." Id. at 374.
Dorothy Ross suggests that a historicist attitude or sensibility views history as "a realm of
human construction, propelled ever forward in time by the cumulative effects of human action,
and taking new qualitative forms." Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 3
(Cambridge U., 1991).
17. Helpful accounts of natural law include the following: Charles G. Haines, The Revival
of Natural Law Concepts (Harvard U., 1930); Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., American Interpretations
of Natural Law (Harvard U., 1931).
1997] 1393
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Part II of this Article explores the premodern legal science of
the first part of the nineteenth century, while Part III focuses on the
modernist jurisprudence of the Langdellians in the years after the
Civil War. The Conclusion briefly contrasts the jurisprudence of
Langdell with that of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a contemporary of
Langdell. Two points should be clarified at the outset. First, this
Article focuses on the mandarins of American legal thought. I discuss
jurisprudential leaders such as James Kent, Joseph Story, Langdell,
and Holmes, not the daily practice of law by the average attorney.
And certainly, the fully developed jurisprudential musings of someone
such as Story, a Harvard professor and Supreme Court Justice, dif-
fered significantly from the average attorney's notion of law. At the
same time, it is worth noting that many of the jurisprudential elite of
the nineteenth century, including Kent, Story, and Holmes, were
scholars and judges, so their conceptions of law were at least informed
by their practical experiences in deciding cases. Second, my conceptu-
alizations of premodernism, modernism, and the various stages within
those respective eras should not be taken to represent categorical
distinctions or rigid demarcations in the history of American jurispru-
dence. Rather, I propose a narrative of nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence that, I believe, offers the most fruitful and persuasive manner
for explicating and understanding that period.18
II. PREMODERN LEGAL SCIENCE
One of the definitive features of premodern American legal
science during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was
a faith in the existence of natural law principles as the foundation for
the common law. In one of the first efforts to articulate an American
conception of law, James Wilson in 1790 explained:
Nature, or, to speak more properly, the Author of nature, has done much
for us; but it is his gracious appointment and will, that we should also do much
for ourselves. What we do, indeed, must be founded on what [He] has done;
and the deficiencies of our laws must be supplied by the perfections of His.
18. In other words, my conceptualization of the different stages of premodernism and
modernism should not be understood as suggesting historical or structural necessities that had
to occur. Rather, the stages are heuristic devices somewhat akin to Weberian "ideal types." See
Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The
Warren Court: A Retrospective at 326 (cited in note 1).
[Vol. 50:13871394
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Human law must rest its authority, ultimately, upon the authority of that law,
which is divine.19
The American faith in natural law was, to a great extent, in-
herited from William Blackstone, who first published his
Commentaries on the Laws of England from 1765 to 1769.20 Wilson
and other American jurisprudents freely relied on the Commentaries:
George Wythe, the first American law professor, based his lectures at
William and Mary on Blackstone; the curriculum of the first American
law school, at Litchfield, Connecticut, was structured around the
Commentaries; and throughout Joseph Story's tenure as a professor at
Harvard, he used Blackstone as a text. Many ordinary lawyers who
learned the law by reading either on their own or in law offices did
little more than read the Commentaries.21 As Nathaniel Chipman
bluntly stated in 1793: "[Blackstone's] Commentaries are the only
treatise of law, to which the law students, in these states, have ac-
cess."22 Furthermore, not only was Blackstone published in many
American editions, but the earliest treatises to focus on American law,
19. James Wilson, 1 The Works of James Wilson 124 (Belknap, 1967). See Miller, The Life
of the Mind in America at 164-65 (cited in note 1) (discussing the contributions of Blackstone,
Wilson, and Chipman to the philosophical underpinnings of positive law). See generally Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 Yale L. J. 907 (1993)
(discussing the conceptions of natural rights and natural law during the framers' generation).
Wilson's Lectures on Law were delivered in 1790 but not published until after his death in 1804.
Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 141 (cited in note 1). Other leading works of early
nineteenth-century American jurisprudence that I discuss in this Part include the following:
James Gould, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading, in Civil Actions (B & S Collins, 2d ed.
1836); Francis Hilliard, The Elements of Law (Hilliard, Gray, 1835) (1972 reprint); David
Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study (Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836) (1st ed. published 1817); James
Kent, Commentaries on American Law (J. Van Norden, 5th ed. 1844); Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Carolina Academic Press, 1987) (reprint
of Story's own 1833 one-volume abridgment of the original three-volume 1833 ed.); William W.
Story, ed., Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Little, Brown, 1852) (1972 reprint).
20. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon, 1765-69) (1979
reprint). See Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 164-65 (cited in note 1) (discussing the
influence of Blackstone's natural law orientation in America). For a helpful discussion of
Blackstone's influence in America, see Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 731 (1976).
21. See Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 134 (cited in note 1); Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic at 761-67 (cited in note 20) (noting importance of the
Commentaries to attorneys, especially in the frontier states). See, for example, Wilson, 1 The
Works of James Wilson at 100, 614-16 (cited in note 19) (citing the Commentaries for their
influence on the development of criminal jurisprudence in America).
22. Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), reprinted in Perry
Miller, ed., The Legal Mind in America 19, 29 (Anchor, 1962) (emphasis added).
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published during the first half of the nineteenth century, followed in
the Blackstonian mold.
23
Blackstone initially wrote the Commentaries to promote legal
education in a university setting. In so doing, he presented law as a
science, a "rational science,"24 that included an extensive discussion of
natural law.25 To Blackstone, the principles of natural law are uni-
versal and superior to positive law, including the common law. In
those fields where natural law is "indifferent"-a field such "as export-
ing wool into foreign countries"--humans can make positive law to
command or prohibit any conduct whatsoever. 26 But in those areas
where the law of nature is "not indifferent, human laws are only de-
claratory of, and act in subordination to[,] [natural law principles]." 27
Natural law, according to Blackstone, is either revealed by God
or discoverable through human reason.m For example, Blackstone
asserted that the right of property originated in Scripture. The Bible
declares that God gave humankind dominion over the Earth and all
things upon it. Then, from the law of nature and reason, the use,
possession, and occupancy of land and objects generated the concept of
property.29 Blackstone concluded:
Property, both in land and moveables, being thus originally acquired by the
first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to
appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of
23. See, for example, Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 74-75 (cited in note 19) (celebrating
Blackstone). For an American edition of Blackstone, see William Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England (William E. Dean, 1832). See Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding
Positivism, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2054, 2086-87 (1995) (discussing the influence of Blackstone on the
nineteenth-century American treatise tradition). Dennis Nolan notes that the St. George Tucker
edition of Blackstone "fixed the Blackstone tradition in this country." Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic at 761 (cited in note 20).
24. Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 2 (cited in note 20). See Nolan,
Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic at 735, 760-61 (cited in note 20)
(discussing Blackstone's belief in law as a science).
25. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 41 (cited in note 20).
Blackstone states:
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and
at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as
are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from
this original.
Id.
26. Id. at 42-43.
27. Id. at 42.
28. At times, Blackstone wrote of both God's revealed law and law discoverable through
reason as the law of nature. Other times, Blackstone suggested that revealed law is, in effect, a
higher form of natural law. See id. at 40-44.
29. Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 2-9 (cited in note 20).
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universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shews an
intention to abandon it .... 30
As previously stated, American jurisprudents readily accepted
Blackstone's natural law orientation. For example, James Kent, in his
Commentaries on American Law, repeatedly referred to natural and
universal justice, natural and unalienable rights, natural jurispru-
dence, and divine revelation. 31 At least three factors characteristic of
the American context contributed to this easy reception of
Blackstone's natural law.3 2 First, natural law provided a convenient
and useful justification for the adoption of the English common law in
the various states of the burgeoning nation. Especially in the decades
following soon after the Revolutionary War, if the common law had
been understood merely as an English institution distinctive to
Britain itself, then an American reliance on the common law would
have seemed impolitic or even treasonous.33 If, however, the common
law arose from universal principles of the law of nature, which were
revealed by God or discovered through human reason, then the com-
mon law would be legitimate everywhere, including in America.
3 4
30. Id. at 9. Perry Miller writes:
William Blackstone was a man of his century and therefore constructed his organization
of the Common Law upon a premise which his age took so much for granted that he
hardly needed to state it: all positive law is an endeavor to enact universal natural law.
As to precisely how the Common Law, in its heterogeneity, managed to incarnate the
homogeneous law of nature has been, for students of Blackstone, a subject of debate. For
readers in America, however, he seemed entirely straightforward, and simply confirmed
their own uncomplicated axiom.
Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 164 (cited in note 1).
31. See Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law at 2 (cited in note 19) (discussing natural
jurisprudence and divine revelation); id. at 470 (discussing natural justice); Kent, 2
Commentaries on American Law at 1, 11-13 (cited in note 19) (discussing natural rights); id. at
477 (mentioning universal justice).
32. See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 10-12 (cited in note 17)
(describing Blackstone's Commentaries as admirably suited to American political doctrine at the
time of the Revolution). Charles G. Haines notes that a commitment to natural law lasted longer
in the United States than in Europe. See Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts at 67-71
(cited in note 17). For discussions of different conceptions of natural law, see id. at 24-27;
Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 3-4, 331-41 (cited in note 17).
33. Perry Miller, Introduction, in Perry Miller, ed., The Legal Mind in America 15, 17
(Anchor, 1962) (stating that, following the Revolution, patriots identified British common law
with tyranny).
34. See Horwitz I at 4-7 (cited in note 1) (discussing the American adoption of English
common law principles); LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 36-37 (cited in note 2) (discussing
judicial use of common law concepts to decide cases); Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at
129 (cited in note 1) (discussing the intellectual acceptance of the common law in America). For a
contemporary discussion of whether the new nation should adopt the English common law, see
generally Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government, reprinted in Miller, ed., The Legal
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Second, the idea that the common law was based on natural
principles fit within the American social context of the first half of the
nineteenth century. Many observers at that time still assumed that
societies were naturally stratified and ordered. In the United States,
despite tremendous economic changes and the spread of democracy
and legal equality during this period, distinct social hierarchies
remained conspicuously ingrained. 5 Consequently, many Americans
readily accepted the notion that the common law imposed social
obligations that arose naturally or customarily from one's status
within society.
36
Third, most Americans were so deeply committed to Protestant
Christianity that they were particularly receptive to invocations of
natural law. 3 During the eighteenth century, the North American
colonies and then the states (after the American Revolution) embraced
either the governmental establishment of Christianity or, at a mini-
mum, the de facto establishment of Christianity throughout civil soci-
ety.38 American culture was so pervasively Protestant that govern-
Mind in America (cited in note 22). Stephen N. Subrin notes: "Soon after it convened in 1774,
the Continental Congress resolved 'that the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of
England....' After 1776, several states passed reception statutes that adopted the 'common
law.'" Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 928 (1987).
35. See Douglas T. Miller, The Birth of Modern America 1820.1850 117-25 (Bobbs-Merrill,
1970) ("Recognizable class distinctions existed in all sections of the country and were recognized
by all ranks of society."); White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-1835 at 19 (cited
in note 1). Compare Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 6-7 (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1991) (emphasizing the spread of democracy).
36. See Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice, in Geison, ed., Professions and
Professional Ideologies in America at 84-85 (cited in note 1) ("[Ihe whole society was visualized
as a network of interlaced fiduciary relationships preserving hierarchies within a republican
framework.). Joseph William Singer writes:
In the preclassical period during the first half of the nineteenth century, almost all of law
was incorporated into the contractual model. But freedom of contract was a dim dream;
rather, the market was heavily regulated by custom and law. All private relationships
included implicit obligations that were enforceable by the state. These obligations varied
depending on the kind of relationship involved. Almost everyone appeared to occupy a
status most of the time, as master or servant, as attorney or client, as bailor or bailee, as
husband or wife, as landlord or tenant. One could voluntarily enter one of the regulated
relationships, but once one entered the relationship, the terms and obligations
accompanying it were substantially predefined by the state through the common law.
The parties had little or no power to alter the terms of the relationship by contract. In
this sense, no aspect of life was conceptualized as free from state control.
The legal rules governing each of these stereotypical relationships imposed
normative ideas of fairness.
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 477 (1988) (reviewing Laura
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (U. of North Carolina, 1986))..
37. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 164-65, 206 (cited in note 1).
38. See Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History
of the Separation of Church and State 119-74 (New York U., 1997). Theodore Dwight Bozeman,
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mental church establishment was almost beside the point-it made so
little difference. Even so, the Second Great Awakening, which swept
across America during the first part of the nineteenth century,
strengthened the Protestant pulse running through American soci-
ety.39 Nathan Hatch argues that the "wave of popular religious
movements that broke upon the United States in the half-century
after independence did more to Christianize American society than
anything before or since.
''40
Jurisprudents and jurists typically considered Christianity and
the common law to be closely intertwined: Christianity was a compo-
nent of the common law, and the common law was based partly on
Christian morality. David Hoffman, professor of law at the University
of Maryland, published his first Course of Legal Study in 1817 and
prepared a second edition in 1836.41 The Course was intended primar-
ily to shepherd students through the available primary and secondary
works on the law; the second edition was expanded to serve also as a
resource for attorneys, judges, and statesmen.42  Hoffman not only
underscored the importance of natural law and revelation in his defi-
nition of law,'43 but he also began his Course by focusing on the Bible.
Hoffman taught:
The purity and sublimity of the morals of the Bible have at no time been
questioned; it is the foundation of the common law of every christian nation.
Protestants in an Age of Science 46-47 (U. of North Carolina, 1977) (discussing the repudiation of
religious skepticism in nineteenth-century America).
39. Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 178-79 (cited in note 38).
40. Nathan 0. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity 3 (Yale U., 1989).
Between 1800 and 1835, church membership nearly doubled, and if one accounts for the
Americans who were church-goers but not official members, then fully 75% percent of the
population attended church. See Winthrop S. Hudson and John Corrigan, Religion in America
129-30 (Scribner, 5th ed. 1992). See also Martin E. Marty, Protestantism in the United States:
Righteous Empire 169 (Dial, 2d ed. 1986).
41. See Perry Miller, David Hoffman, in Perry Miller, ed., The Legal Mind in America 83
(Anchor, 1962) (noting that Hoffiman became a professor in 1816). The second edition actually
was not published until 1846. See Hoffman, 1 A Course of Legal Study at i (cited in note 19).
42. See Hoffman, 1 A Course of Legal Study at xi-xii (cited in note 19). Each chapter or
title contained an extensive list of recommended readings as well as Hoffman's guiding notes on
many of those readings.
43. Hoffman wrote:
Law, as applied to human conduct generally, signifies that body of rules established for
the regulation of human economy, whether national or individual; dictated to us by the
light of nature, or by revelation; or prescribed by human superiors for individual
observance; or ordained by the consent, express or implied, of sovereign states, for the
guidance of international conduct; and to which those respectively, to whom the rules are
directed, are obliged to make their actions conformable.
Id. at 55.
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The Christian religion is a part of the law of the land, and, as such, should
certainly receive no inconsiderable portion of the lawyer's attention.
44
Unsurprisingly, state courts consistently enforced the
Christian sabbath of Sunday and upheld prohibitions of blasphemy
against Christianity.45 In the New York case of People v. Ruggles,
decided in 1811, the state's highest court upheld the constitutionality
of a common law criminal conviction of Ruggles for committing blas-
phemy. Ruggles had said that "Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his
mother must be a whore." James Kent, writing the opinion in the
case, maintained "that we are a christian people, and the morality of
the country is deeply ingrafted upon christianity."46 Thus, with regard
to the common law in general, LaPiana correctly observes: "[Tihere
was widespread agreement that the principles of private law were
congruent with and dictated by the absolutely true requirements of
Christian morality. Law was principles, and properly decided cases
reflected those principles, which themselves, in the end, were God's
plan for governing the nation. 47
The American jurisprudents of the early nineteenth century
not only followed Blackstone by relying on natural law, but they also
followed him by presenting law as science. Hoffman, Kent, Francis
Hilliard, and Joseph Story all consistently referred to the science of
jurisprudence or legal science.48 The specific parameters of the early
nineteenth-century conception of legal science were derived from at
least two sources: the writings of Francis Bacon and the forms of
action unique to common law pleading.
Although Bacon had written his most important works in the
early seventeenth century, he replaced Locke as the most prestigious
English philosopher in America at the outset of the nineteenth cen-
tury.49  American legal scholars repeatedly cited and quoted from
"Lord Bacon," celebrating, in Story's words, "the profoundness of his
44. Id. at 65.
45. See Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 187-89 (cited in note 38);
Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 192-95 (cited in note 1). Miller also notes that some
jurists denied that Christianity was part of the common law. See id. at 195-96.
46. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. R. 290 (N.Y. 1811), reprinted in Philip B. Kurland and
Ralph Lerner, eds., 5 The Founders' Constitution 101, 101 (U. of Chicago, 1987). Kent reasoned
that the state could punish blasphemy against Christ without similarly punishing blasphemies
under other religions. Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 188 (cited in note
38).
47. William P. LaPiana, Honor Langdell, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 761, 762-63 (1995).
48. See, for example, Hilliard, The Elements of Law at iv (cited in note 19); Hoffman, 1 A
Course of Legal Study at 23 (cited in note 19); Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 69-71, 73, 79
(cited in note 19).
49. Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 23-30 (cited in note 38).
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genius, and.., the wisdom and comprehensiveness of his views."50
The nineteenth-century American understanding of Baconian science
(not only legal science) was characterized by observation, generaliza-
tion, and classification. A Baconian perspective was grounded on faith
in human sense experience so that careful observation could reveal
truth. Then, from multiple observations of the relevant phenomena,
humans could generalize and induce ultimate principles of nature.
Finally, those principles could be classified and ordered into a rational
system.51 Significantly, Baconian science became Christianized in
nineteenth-century America: Christianity and science were under-
stood not to be opposed to each other, but rather to be complementary
and mutually supportive. As Theodore Bozeman observes: "'Truth,'
in fact, pointed to an important mode of religious experience in
antebellum America. To know the truth of things was to taste
'majesty and glory,' for the massive panorama of nature was almost
everywhere understood as an unfolding of Divine creativity."52
In legal science, James Wilson explained the applicability of
Baconianism to jurisprudence.
In legal science, says my Lord Bacon, they are the soundest, that keep close to
particulars.... In this view, common law, like natural philosophy, when
properly studied, is a science founded on experiment.... Hence, in both, the
most regular and undeviating principles will be found, on accurate
investigation, to guide and control the most diversified and disjointed
appearances.
53
In the early nineteenth-century treatises, the Baconian roots were
manifested in at least three important ways. First, although the trea-
tises emphasized natural law and were organized loosely around
broad principles, such as the protection of property, liberty, and per-
50. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 203 (cited in note 19). See, for example, Hoffman 1 A
Course of Legal Study at 20, 22, 36 (cited in note 19); Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law at
v, 47, 475, 478, 505, 510 (cited in note 19). Story stated in 1826: "Where shall we find the true
logic of physical science so admirably stated, as in the Novum Organum of him, who more than
two centuries ago saw, as in a vision, and foretold, as in prophecy, the sublime discoveries of
these latter days?" Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 29 (cited in note 38) (quoting
Joseph Story, Characteristics of the Age 428).
51. See Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 3-10, 56, 62-63 (cited in note 38)
(discussing the development of a "Baconian Philosophy"). LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 29
(cited in note 2) (stating that the definition of law as a scientific system of principles originated
with Bacon). Bozeman acknowledges that competing views of science also existed at this time.
See Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 75, 86-96 (cited in note 38).
52. Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 60 (cited in note 38). See id. at 44-45.
53. Wilson, 1 The Works of James Wilson at 356 (cited in note 19).
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sonal security, the authors tended to display a faithful acceptance of
case decisions and a bottom-up style characteristic of inductive
reasoning.54  They paid close attention to detail, often filling the
treatises with specific low-level rules and copious footnotes that cited
and discussed numerous cases.5 5 Theophilus Parsons's The Law of
Contracts, for instance, cited over 6,000 cases.56 Treatise sections and
subsections often reflected rather narrow factual situations in which
cases repeatedly arose. In Kent's Commentaries, the lecture on con-
tracts included a section on "passing the title by delivery," with sub-
sections on, among other things, payment and tender, earnest and
part payment, conditions attached to delivery, delivery to agent, sym-
bolic delivery, and place of delivery.57 In Kent's part on real property,
the lecture on incorporeal hereditaments included a section on ease-
ments and aquatic rights, which was further subdivided as follows: of
ways, riparian rights, highways, party-walls, division fences, and
easements acquired and lost by proscription. This last subsection was
again divided into the categories of water, light, and air.58
Second, Baconianism was apparent in the attention that the
treatise writers gave to classifying and systematizing American law.
To American jurisprudents, law was a science because, above all, law
was a rational system of principles. 59 Hoffman belittled the idea that
law is "a mere collection of positive rules and institutions. ''60 Instead,
"[i]f law be a science and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be
founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of
reason."'61 The lawyer, therefore, "must have entered into the prin-
ciples, discovered the harmonies, and arranged with method and
curiosity the innumerable topicks of the science."62
Third, despite the American jurisprudents' penchant for focus-
ing on cases and low-level rules, they believed that legal principles,
including natural law principles, existed apart from their manifesta-
54. For discussions of the broad natural rights of property, security, and liberty, see
Hilliard, The Elements of Law at 9 (cited in note 19); Kent, 2 Commentaries onnAmerican Law at
1 (cited in note 19).
55. See, for example, Kent, Commentaries on American Law (cited in note 19).
56. See Theophilus Parsons, The Law of Contracts (Little, Brown, 1857). See also
Theophilus Parsons, The Law of Contracts xiii-xiv (Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1866) (preface to 1st
ed.) (stressing Parsons's effort to provide a "complete library" on the subject).
57. See Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 492-509 (cited in note 19).
58. See Kent, 3 Commentaries on American Law at 401-48 (cited in note 19).
59. See Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 117-21 (cited in note 1).
60. Hoffman, 1 A Course of Legal Study at 25 (cited in note 19).
61. Id. (quoting William Jones, Essay on Bailments).
62. David Hoffman, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Lectures (1823), reprinted in
Perry Miller, ed., The Legal Mind in America 83, 85 (Anchor, 1962).
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tions in the decided cases. Baconianism never supported any form of
nominalism,63 which would have suggested that nothing existed but
the individual case decisions. Perhaps, the best way to understand
the metaphysical relationship between the cases and the principles in
early nineteenth-century legal science may be to compare, at the risk
of mixing philosophical metaphors, American (Baconian) jurispru-
dence with Plato's philosophy-specifically, Plato's theory of Ideas (or
Forms).64 "The essence of the theory of Ideas," according to David
Ross, "lay in the conscious recognition of the fact that there is a class
of entities, for which the best name is probably 'universals', that are
entirely different from sensible things. ' 65 For Plato, the Ideas or
Forms are real or objective entities that exist separately and distinctly
from sensible things. Each sensible thing or particular instance of an
object partakes of, or shares in, an Idea, but no particular instance
perfectly exemplifies any Idea. The Ideas are universal, unchanging,
and stable, while sensible things are ephemeral and in flux. For ex-
ample, Plato distinguished between the many objects that are beauti-
ful and the Idea of beauty. The myriad objects manifest or are
imperfect copies of the Idea, but they are not the same as the
Idea---"absolute beauty."6
The Platonic relationship between Ideas and particulars illu-
minates the relation between case decisions and legal principles in
63. Nominalism "is usually associated with the thought that everything that exists is a
particular individual, and therefore there are no such things as universals" Simon Blackburn,
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 264 (Oxford U., 1994).
64. Plato developed his theory of Ideas in The Republic and The Phaedo. See Plato, The
Republic, reprinted in Benjamin Jowett, trans., The Republic and Other Works 7 (Anchor, 1973)
("Republic"); Plato, Phaedo, reprinted in Benjamin Jowett, trans., The Republic and Other Works
487 (Anchor, 1973) ("Phaedo"). Helpful secondary sources on Plato include the following. Joseph
Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1959); David Ross,
Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford U., 2d ed. 1953).
65. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas at 225 (cited in note 64).
66. Phaedo at 534 (cited in note 64). See Republic at 169, 173 (cited in note 64); Phaedo at
505-12, 534-35 (cited in note 64). See also Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy at
197-229 (cited in note 64). Ross discusses the possibility of interpreting Plato's theory of Ideas in
some other manner:
It may be doubted whether Plato thus 'separated' the universal from its particulars. To
distinguish the universal from its particulars is in a sense to separate it. It is to think of
it as a distinct entity. Whether Plato also thought of it as a separately existing entity, it
is hard to say. Much of his language lends itself to the charge, but it is possible that he
may only be putting in an emphatic and picturesque way the doctrine that particulars
always imply a universal. Yet it is hard to suppose that Aristotle could have so
thoroughly misinterpreted a master with whom he was presumably for years in constant
contact, as to take for a fundamental difference of view what was really only a difference
of emphasis and expression.
David Ross, Aristotle 158 (Methuen, 5th ed. 1949).
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early nineteenth-century legal science. While in Plato's theory the
Ideas or universals supposedly exist separately from the many sensi-
ble things, in jurisprudential theory, legal principles supposedly exist
separately from the countless cases. The cases manifest the princi-
ples, but the cases themselves are not equivalent to the principles.
Francis Hilliard perfectly captured this relationship between the
principles and the cases in his Elements of Law:
[I]n law, as in other sciences, there are certain broad and fixed principles,
which embody the essence of the system, and remain unchanged amidst the
fluctuations of successive ages.... [The increase of the law arises, not from
any change in them, but from that infinite variety of facts and circumstances,
to which the transactions of mankind give rise.
67
Thus, the few legal principles are universal, unchanging, and stable,
while the many cases imperfectly exemplify them. In the words of
Joseph Story, "the decisions of Courts... are, at most, only evidence
of what the laws are; and are not of themselves law."6
8
This Platonic understanding of the relationship between legal
principles and cases also helps reconcile the seemingly opposed views
of LaPiana and Gordon on antebellum legal science. LaPiana
(consistently with G. Edward White) characterizes antebellum legal
science as primarily animated by natural law principles, 69 while
Gordon (consistently with Morton Horwitz, Karl Llewellyn, and Grant
Gilmore) argues that it is instead largely defined by a pragmatic,
policy-oriented approach to judicial decision making.70 As discussed
67. Hilliard, The Elements of Law at v (cited in note 19) (emphasis omitted). Hilliard's
reliance on natural law is especially significant because he claimed to design The Elements of
Law "as a cheap manual for popular use: Id. at 8. As such, according to Hilliard, the book
"carefully abstains from all criticism, speculation, or history; and confines itself to a plain, brief
statement of principles now in force, with occasional illustrations." Id. at iv. If even in such a
practically oriented work, the author relied in part on natural law, a reliance on natural law
apparently was widespread.
68. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
69. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 34 (cited in note 2). See also White, The
Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-1835 at 129, 135, 153-54 (cited in note 1) (arguing
that Americans were "bound by those common law rules that seemed consistent with the
principles of natural justice"). LaPiana does not cite White on this point.
70. Gordon, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 1252-53 (cited in note 3). See also Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law at 19-40 (cited in note 1) (describing the development of antebellum
jurisprudence); Horwitz I at 1-30 (cited in note 1); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition 36, 64-72 (Little, Brown, 1960) (discussing and giving examples of applying policy and
principles to cases). Gordon expressly cites Horwitz and Llewellyn, among others, but does not
cite Gilmore on this point. See Gordon, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 1253 n.66 (cited in note 3). To be
clear, Gordon does not deny that legal writers during this period referred to "revealed truth and
natural law," but he nonetheless maintains that the part played by natural law was "relatively
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earlier, a strong commitment to natural law did indeed mark the first
part of the nineteenth century, but nonetheless, as I will explain, a
pragmatic or instrumental approach simultaneously characterized
this period, especially from approximately 1820 onward.
America experienced an enormous economic transformation
during the first decades of the nineteenth century.71 Spurred in part
by the exigencies of the War of 1812, the United States began to
metamorphose, changing from a largely agricultural country into an
industrial society and economy.7 2 As the Industrial Revolution came
to America, particularly to the Northeast, the transition in the
American economy was startling: In 1800, eighty-three percent of the
labor force was in agriculture, but by 1860, only fifty-three percent
remained similarly occupied.73 Many Americans became obsessed
with a commitment to commerce and the rapid accumulation of per-
sonal wealth. In response to these economic transitions, the American
notion of science also changed, becoming more practical and utilitar-
ian. Scientists became preoccupied with the pursuit of useful and
profitable inventions such as the steamboat and the telegraph.7 4
small." Id. at 1251. Instead, according to Gordon, "arguments about 'convenience' or
'policy'... usually trumped the considerations of morality that LaPiana emphasizes." Id. at
1253. Horwitz, more strongly than Gordon, accentuates a transition from a natural law approach
to an instrumental approach in the early nineteenth century. Horwitz writes:
By 1820 the legal landscape in America bore only the faintest resemblance to what
existed forty years earlier.... Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of
principles expressed in custom and derived from natural law. Nor was it regarded
primarily as a body of rules designed to achieve justice only in the individual case.
Instead, judges came to think of the common law as equally responsible with legislation
for governing society and promoting socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as
an instrument of policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal
doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about social change.
Horwitz I at 30 (cited in note 1).
71. See Miller, The Birth of Modern America 1820-1850, at 19-41 (cited in note 35)
(describing and explaining America's expansion following the War of 1812).
72. Because of America's own restrictive trade policies and British blockades, the War of
1812 forced Americans to begin producing goods that previously had been imported. Id. at 28-29.
See Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 126-27, 292, 297 (cited in note 1) (noting the
economic and legal reorientation wrought by the War of 1812).
73. See Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 325-47 (cited in note 35)
(chronicling the "celebration of commerce" in post-revolutionary America); Stephan A.
Thernstrom, 1 A History of the American People 238 (Harcourt, Brace, 2d ed. 1989) (providing
statistics).
74. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 291.92, 297 (cited in note 1). See Miller, The
Birth of Modern America 1820-1850, at 26-28 (cited in note 35) (describing technological im-
provements such as grain-handling machines and the steamboat). See also Feldman, Please
Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 176 (cited in note 38) (discussing economic changes). In
1835, Francis Hilliard declared that, "all knowledge is held to be practical." Hilliard, The
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As the general concept of science altered, so did the specific
conception of legal science, as it too became increasingly focused on
pragmatic concerns and the instrumental promotion of commerce.
The revered Lord Mansfield further inspired this transition in juris-
prudence. In the eighteenth century, Mansfield had demonstrated the
practical advantages of an instrumental approach to judicial decision
making by, in effect, creating the commercial law of Britain.75 In
America, Kent asserted that the question of whether to follow a rule
from an earlier case "very often resolves itself into a mere question of
expediency, depending upon the consideration of the importance of
certainty in the rule, and the extent of property to be affected by a
change of it."76 Similarly, Francis Hilliard stated that, in common law
decision making, "[g]eneral expediency,-public policy,-is often the
highest measure of right.' '77 The state and federal courts thus devel-
oped policies in the form of common law rules that tended to spark
commercial activity and economic development. For instance, during
the first part of the nineteenth century, the courts transformed the
common law concept of property: Whereas the earlier conception of
property allowed an owner to prevent others from injuring his or her
property, the later conception allowed an owner to do with his or her
property whatever was desired, regardless of the effects on others.
The courts, in other words, developed rules that protected property
owners from potential liabilities for damages caused by efforts to
develop their property for commercial purposes.78 Property became, in
effect, an "institution of growth."79 In another example, in Swift v.
Tyson, decided in 1842, the Supreme Court held that the federal
courts should decide commercial cases based on a general federal
Elements of Law at viii (cited in note 19). Louis Dupr6 notes that a Baconian view also endorsed
a view of knowledge as practical. Duprd, Passage to Modernity at 72-73 (cited in note 6).
75. See Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 275 (cited in note 19) (discussing Mansfield's role
with regard to the commercial law of Britain). For celebrations of Mansfield's greatness, see
Hilliard, The Elements of Law at 8 (cited in note 19); Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law at
477 (cited in note 19); Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 322 (cited in note 19). Story
wrote: "[Tihe name of Lord Mansfield will be held in reverence by the good and the wise, by the
honest merchant, the enlightened lawyer, the just statesman, and the conscientious judge."
Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 205 (cited in note 19).
76. Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law at 477 (cited in note 19).
77. Hilliard, The Elements of Law at vi (cited in note 19).
78. See Horwitz I at 99-102, 211-52 (cited in note 1) (discussing heightening of common law
negligence standard and the development of insurance law).
79. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century
United States 28 (U. of Wisconsin, 1956).
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common law that implicitly would be directed toward promoting
economic activity.80
Hence, antebellum legal scientists did indeed become commit-
ted to a practical and instrumental approach to judicial decision mak-
ing early in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, this pragmatic
approach was understood to be entirely consistent with the concurrent
natural law orientation. As Story explained, when praising Lord
Mansfield's decisions in maritime and commercial law, "the general
consistency with principle is as distinguishable[] as their practical
importance."81 Kent declared that the right of property not only arises
from the law of nature and revelation but also spurs humanity to
social and commercial progress:
The sense of property is graciously bestowed on mankind, for the purpose of
rousing them from sloth, and stimulating them to action; and so long as the
right of acquisition is exercised in conformity to the social relations, and the
moral obligations which spring from them, it ought to be sacredly protected.
The natural and active sense of property pervades the foundations of social
improvement.
82
But how, precisely, could a commitment to principles, particu-
larly natural law principles, be consistent with an instrumental ap-
proach to judicial decision making? The answer lay in the Platonic
relationship between the principles and the cases. According to Plato,
the Ideas exist separately from the particular instances. The Ideas
are universal and unchanging, while the particular instances vary,
manifesting but never perfectly exemplifying the Ideas. As suggested
above, antebellum jurisprudents understood the relation between
legal principles and cases in a similar fashion: Legal principles are
universal and separate from the cases, which represent imperfect
manifestations of the principles. From this perspective, natural law
principles provided a metaphysical foundation for the American legal
system, including the common law. Yet, in concrete judicial disputes,
80. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See
Gilmore, The Ages of American Law at 30-36 (cited in note 1) (discussing Swift); Horwitz I at 245-
52 (cited in note 1) (arguing that Swift can be seen as an attempt to impose a pro-commercial
national legal order on unwilling state courts).
81. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 69 (cited in note 19).
82. Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 319 (cited in note 19). Kent continued: "It
leads to the cultivation of the earth, the institution of government, the establishment of justice,
the acquisition of the comforts of life, the growth of the useful arts, the spirit of commerce, the
productions of taste, the erections of charity, and the display of the benevolent affections." Id.
See id. at 318-19 (discussing the fundamental nature of acquiring and owning property).
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the principles needed to be specifically interpreted and applied and as
judges did so, the judges were to be practical and instrumental.
Indeed, as Thomas Grey has noted, jurists and jurisprudents of this
time did not assume, for the most part, that they could reason
deductively downward from the general principles to mechanically
ascertain lower-level legal rules or the correct outcomes in concrete
disputes. A knowledge of the principles might guide but could not
dictate a judge's determination in any specific case.8 3  In an 1854
opinion, Lemuel Shaw captured the Platonic relation between the
universal principles of natural law and his instrumental decision
making in particular cases:
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, instead of
a series of detailed practical rules ... the common law consists of a few broad
and comprehensive principles founded on reason, natural justice, and enlight-
ened public policy modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the
particular cases which fall within it. [While the common law] has its
foundations in the principles of equity, natural justice, and that general
convenience which is public policy; although these general considerations
would be too vague and uncertain for practical purposes, in the various and
complicated cases, of daily occurrence, in the business of an active community;
yet the rules of the common law, so far as cases have arisen and practices
actually grown up, are rendered, in a good degree, precise and certain, for
practical purposes, by usage and judicial precedent.8
4
Because of the instrumental approach to judicial decision mak-
ing, the natural law principles faded into the juridical background in
most instances. Yet, although the principles only rarely would be
referred to in specific cases, the principles always remained significant
as a foundation for the legal system-a foundation of principles that
could fade into the background only because so many American
judges, lawyers, and jurisprudents willingly agreed upon and accepted
the idea of broad natural law principles. Moreover, such a stable
foundation was important as a means for justifying instrumental deci-
sion making in the courts. Hilliard argued, for example, that judges
83. See Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 8-9 n.27 (cited in note 1) (discussing "the Grand Style"
of jurisprudence which characterized American decisions before the Civil War).
84. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Main R.R. Co., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854). Judge Shaw
went on to hold that railroads, though recently invented, fit within the concept of a common
carrier under the common law. See id. at 269-70. Perry Miller cautions that the freedom of
judges during this period to instrumentally shape the law should not be overstated. Miller, The
Life of the Mind in America at 128 (cited in note 1).
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should be guided by "the universal law of reason and justice" when
they had to make law.85
As the instrumental approach took hold of American jurispru-
dence in the first decades of the nineteenth century, legal science
moved from the first to the second stage of premodernism. Americans
who participated in the Revolution and the constitutional framing
were, to a significant extent, still first-stage premodernists. For the
most part, they retained a cyclical view of history. Hence, the
constitutional framers had been concerned especially with the fragility
of the new democratic republic. From the first-stage premodernist
standpoint, civilizations rise and fall,86 so the goal of the Framers, in
particular, was to construct a governmental scheme that could
preserve the republic as long as possible. The Framers thus sought to
construct a constitutional government that would strain toward civic
republican principles of virtue and the common good, but
simultaneously would protect against the self-interested political
machinations of factional groups. The purpose of the Constitution, in
other words, became the structuring of a stable government that
would act for the public good despite the inherent fragility of the
republic.
87
85. Hilliard, The Elements of Law at 3 (cited in note 19). Hilliard's complete statement is
as follows:
[U]pon many judicial questions, the aid of authority, of analogous decided cases, is wholly
wanting. It then becomes the duty of a judge, not indeed to pass an arbitrary edict, but,
taking for his guide the universal law of reason and justice, to invest that law with the
sanction and the imperative force of a distinct judgment, and thereby make it the law of
the land, no longer open to argument and dispute.
Id. (emphasis added). The significance of natural law principles as a foundation for instrumental
decision making is elucidated if the premodern nineteenth century is compared with the modern-
ist twentieth century. Specifically, during the 1930s, the American legal realists also advocated
an instrumental approach to decision making. By that time, however, the foundations for
American values and goals were open to serious debate at the deepest levels. Charges of ethical
relativism were aimed at the realists, who were then castigated for supposedly supporting a
manipulative legal system bereft of morality and akin to fascism. See Feldman, From
Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court:
A Retrospective at 333-34 (cited in note 1). See, for example, Francis Lucey, Natural Law and
American Legal Realism, 30 Geo. L. J. 493 (1942). I do not mean to suggest, however, that
realism died because of these attacks. Laura Kalman argues that Yale remained a hotbed of
realism in the years after World War H. See Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960, at 145-
87 (cited in note 1).
86. Miller, The Birth of Modern America 1820-1850, at 35-36 (cited in note 35). See
Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24 William & Mary Q. 3, 6-
7, 17-19 (1967) (describing the historical origins of the framers' belief in a cyclical theory of
history and how this affected the Revolution).
87. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz,
ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective at 170-73 (cited in note 1). See J.G-A. Pocock, The
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By the time that James Monroe left the presidency in 1825,
however, a new generation of Americans had risen to power.8 The
new generation, inspired in part by the ongoing economic transforma-
tion of the nation, was composed largely of second-stage premodern-
ists. As the idea of progress took hold, science, in particular, was seen
as the instrument by which America could push forward.
Jurisprudents were fully aware of this momentous transition in
America.89
Significantly, though, progress was understood as the move-
ment toward the realization of eternal and universal princi-
ples-principles derived from nature and Protestant Christianity.9
Machiavellian Moment 462-552 (Princeton U., 1975) (describing the American Revolution's
position as "the last act of the civic Renaissance"); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic 1776.1787 (U. of North Carolina, 1969). See, for example, Federalist No. 10 (Madison)
in Clinton Rossiter, ed., Th Federalist Papers 77 (Mentor, 1961) (arguing that the republican
form of government is more stable than a traditional form of democracy); Federalist No. 51
(Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 320, 322 (Mentor, 1961) ("Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition."). Madison wrote: "To secure the public good and private
rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the
form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed."
Federalist No. 10 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 77, 80 (cited in note 87).
Dorothy Ross writes:
It has been common to recognize that Europeans in the early nineteenth century
began to apprehend time in a historicist mode. Whether seen through German idealism
or the positivism of Spencer and Comte, history was understood as a creative process:
culture, society and human nature itself were seen to change fundamentally over the
course of secular time. The timelessness of American thought during the same period
has also been recognized, but Pocock links this characteristic to the prehistoricist logic of
the republican tradition. Believing in the Providential guidance and millennial mission
of the American republic, Americans sought utopian conditions that would stave off the
corruption of historical change and keep secular time frozen in its original and
predetermined course.
Dorothy Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in John
Higham and Paul L Conkin, eds., New Directions in American Intellectual History 116, 121
(Johns Hopkins U., 1979) (citation omitted).
88. See Miller, The Birth of Modern America 1820-1850, at 50 (cited in note 35).
89. Id. at 21. At the constitutional convention of New York State in 1821, Kent proclaimed:
We stand at this moment on the brink of fate, on the very edge of the precipice .... We
are no longer to remain plain and simple republics of farmers, like New-England
colonists, or the Dutch settlements on the Hudson. We are fast becoming a great nation,
with great commerce, manufactures, population, wealth, luxuries, and with the vices and
miseries that they engender.
Id.
90. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 34 (cited in note 2) (explaining the lack of a
theory about legal evolution in antebellum legal thought); Miller, The Life of the Mind in America
at 165-66 (cited in note 1) (discussing how America's early eighteenth-century wisdom was in the
process of transformation into an instrument of American expansion by the early nineteenth
century). G. Edward White writes: "[The generation of the early nineteenth century had largely
abandoned a cyclical theory of change, in which the history of nations inexorably passed from
birth to maturity to decay, but had not yet embraced historicism, a stance which assumes that
qualitative change is a given in the course of nations." White, The Marshall Court and Cultural
Change 1815-1835, at 374 (cited in note 1). I do not mean to suggest that the first-stage premod-
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American jurisprudence, thus, became instrumental and pragmatic in
its quest for progress, but it nevertheless remained premodern, still
grounded on principles of natural law.91 Kent, for example, pro-
claimed that the most recently decided cases presumably contain "the
most correct exposition of the law, and the most judicious application
of abstract and eternal principles."92 The common law, in other words,
progresses as it moves increasingly closer to a perfect realization of its
foundational principles.
In addition to the Baconian view of science, the other signifi-
cant source of the early nineteenth-century conception of legal science
was the forms of action unique to common law pleading. Although
today many legal commentators sharply distinguish legal procedure
from the substance of the law, the nineteenth-century jurisprudents
rarely did so.93 To the contrary, the writs and forms of action were
entwined with the substantive rules of the common law. The links
between procedure and substance were evident in Blackstone's
Commentaries, the model for the later American treatises. When
erm jurisprudents had no conception of progress. See, for example, Wilson, 1 The Works of James
Wilson at 146-47 (cited in note 19) (discussing progress as the perfection or realization of
immutable principles). For the most part, though, any notions of progress during first-stage
premodernism related to the preservation of the republic in the face of inherent instability.
91. In discussing Joseph Story, in particular, White writes:
We have previously seen that a defining characteristic of the intellectual ethos of Story
and his contemporaries was a distinctive attitude toward time and change. Story's
generation was perhaps the last in American history to retain a prehistoricist sensibility,
that is, to conceive of change as the progressive unfolding of first principles rather than
as a continuous, dynamic process. While the past had meaning for the present and
future, it was a selected meaning. Connections between past and future events were
drawn by a backwards ("Whiggish") reading of history: the meaning of the past was
found to reside in a series of general principles, embodied in past events, which were
then applied as moral guidelines to the present and future. This technique required a
characterization of the nature of change which seems alien to modem observers.
Change, for Story's generation, was the equivalent of progress only because it
represented a perfection and restoration of first principles. In times of stress brought
about by the motion of American civilization, the remedy was to review and reassert the
lessons of the past, so that American society could be seen as progressing in accordance
with certain moral principles. The technique by which the past was studied and its core
principles extracted and reasserted was labeled "scientific" by Story and his
contemporaries.
White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-1835, at 360-61 (cited in note 1).
92. Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law at 479 (cited in note 19).
93. See John J. Cound, Jack H. Friedenthal, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 317,
329-33 (West, 2d ed. 1974) (discussing common law writs and forms of action); Fleming James,
Jr., and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 1.3 (Little, Brown, 3rd ed. 1985) (tracing the
historical development of writs). Compare Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976) (arguing from a critical perspective that form
and substance in the law are linked in ways that are often overlooked).
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discussing the rights of persons at common law, Blackstone wrote: "I
shall, first, define the several injuries cognizable by the courts of
common law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particu-
lar injury: and shall, secondly, describe the method of pursuing and
obtaining these remedies in the several courts. 94 In other words, to
Blackstone, discussions of rights, remedies, and the forms of action
were inextricably intertwined: They could not be coherently under-
stood separately and independently. For example, when discussing
express contracts, Blackstone wrote:
Express contracts include three distinct species, debts, covenants, and
promises. 1. The legal acceptation of debt is, a sum of money due by certain
and express agreement. As, by a bond for a determinate sum; a bill or note; a
special bargain; or a rent reserved on a lease; where the quantity is fixed and
unalterable, and does not depend upon any after-calculation to settle it. The
non-payment of these is an injury, for which the proper remedy is by action of
debt, to compel the performance of the contract and recover the specifical sum
due.... The form of the writ of debt is sometimes in the debet and detinet, and
sometimes in the detinet only: that is, the writ states, either that the
defendant owes and unjustly detains the debt or thing in question, or only that
he unjustly detains it .... 95
Blackstone never clearly explained what came first: the con-
ceptualization of an injury or a right, or, the writ and form of action at
common law. The key point, however, was the close interconnection
between the substantive law and the forms of action. As Blackstone
94. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 115 (cited in note 20).
95. Id. at 153-57. Blackstone continued:
2. A covenant also, contained in a deed, to do a direct act or to omit one, is another
species of express contracts, the violation or breach of which is a civil injury. As if a man
covenants to be at York by such a day, or not to exercise a trade in a particular place, and
is not at York at the time appointed, or carries on his trade in the place forbidden, these
are direct breaches of his covenant; and may be perhaps greatly to the disadvantage and
loss of the covenantee. The remedy for this is by writ of covenant: which directs the
sheriff to command the defendant generally to keep his covenant with the plaintiff
(without specifying the nature of the covenant), or [show] good cause to the contrary...
Id. Elsewhere, Blackstone wrote similarly:
Deprivation of possession may also be by an unjust detainer of another's goods, though
the original taking was lawful. As if I distrein another's cattle damage-feasant, and
before they are impounded he tenders me sufficient amends; now, though the original
taking was lawful, my subsequent detainment of them after tender of amends is
wrongful, and he shall have an action of replevin against me to recover them: in which he
shall recover damages only for the detention and not for the caption, because the original
taking was lawful. Or, if I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it,
this injury consists in the detaining, and not in the original taking, and the regular
method for me to recover possession is by action of detinue.
Id. at 150-51.
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stated, "wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury,
it also gives a remedy by action."96
American jurisprudents closely followed this Blackstonian
understanding of the common law. In particular, the forms of action
provided many of the concepts for the classification of the common
law; the legal processes gave shape to the substance of the law.97 For
example, in David Hoffman's Course of Legal Study, the third title
offered recommended readings on personal rights and remedies.
Several sections from Bacon's Abridgment were suggested, including
those on action of account, debt, covenant, detinue, trover, replevin,
and so on.98 Likewise, in Francis Hilliard's The Elements of Law, the
part on private wrongs included a chapter on injuries to personal
property in possession, which included sections on replevin, trespass,
trespass on the case, and trover.99 Most clearly, perhaps, James Gould
and Tapping Reeve explicitly organized the curriculum of the
Litchfield Law School into forty-eight titles that represented Gould
and Reeve's categorization and understanding of the whole of
jurisprudence. The titles, reflecting the importance of the forms of
action for classifying the common law, included the following: action
for covenant broken, action for debt, action for detinue, action of
account, and assumpsit. 1 0
Significantly, then, common law pleading was understood to be
neither arbitrary nor irrational. To the contrary, pleading itself
seemed to fit neatly within the early nineteenth-century conception of
legal science as a rational system. Gould's comments on pleading, in
his Treatise on the Principles of Pleading, illuminated the place of
pleading in premodern legal science. Gould deemed pleading "to be
the most instructive, and therefore the most important single title in
the law."101 Pleading is based on principles that are integrally related
to the substantive law. In Gould's words, pleading owes its preemi-
96. Id. at 123.
97. See G. Edward White, Tort Law in America 8-12 (Oxford U., 1980) (stating that the
writ system served as "a surrogate for doctrinal classification").
98. Hoffman, 1 A Course of Legal Study at 289 (cited in note 19). Hoffman emphasized the
importance of understanding pleading for understanding the law in general. Id. at 348-49.
99. Hilliard, The Elements of Law at 240-44 (cited in note 19).
100. See Advertisement for the Litchfield Law School, Jan. 1, 1828, reprinted in Dennis R.
Nolan, Readings in the History of the American Legal Profession 204 (Michie, 1980); Samuel H.
Fisher, The Litchfield Law School 1775-1833, at 1-11, reprinted in Dennis R. Nolan, Readings in
the History of the American Legal Profession 205 (Michie, 1980).




nence "not solely to the intrinsic value of its own exact and logical
principles, but also, and in no small degree, to the fact, that the prin-
ciples of pleading are necessarily and closely interwoven, both in the-
ory and practice, with those of every other title of the law."102 Gould
unequivocally depicted pleading as a "science."13 Consequently, he
explained the purpose of his book in terms familiar to legal scientists
of the early nineteenth century: His aim was to present the doctrines
of pleading "as a system of consistent and rational principles, adapted,
with the utmost precision, to the administration of justice."
04
In sum, antebellum jurisprudents understood the common law
as a science, a rational system of principles grounded in natural law.
From this premodern perspective, legal principles are universal yet
separate from the cases themselves. The whole of jurisprudence can
be rationally classified into a system that includes not only the natu-
ral law principles but also a multitude of low-level legal rules that
reflect the common law forms of action and pragmatic considerations,
especially those related to the promotion of commerce.
The writings of Joseph Story provide a befitting final illustra-
tion of the components of premodern legal science. To Story, the
science of law demanded systematization, "a scientific arrangement
and harmony of principles." 0 5 Story also described the science of
jurisprudence as ultimately based in natural law: "[T]he law of
nature.... lies at the foundation of all other laws, and constitutes the
first step in the science of jurisprudence."'1 6  Thus, in discussing
contracts, for instance, Story noted: "Nor is this obligatory force [of
contracts] so much the result of the positive declarations of the
municipal law, as of the general principles of natural, or, (as it is
102. Id. at vii. See id. at 14-15.
103. See, for example, id. at vi, 14 (referring to pleading as a science).
104. Id. at viii. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 42-44 (cited in note 2) (discussing the
importance of pleading to antebellum legal science).
105. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 69 (cited in note 19). See id. at 79 (declaring that law
is composed of "regular systems, built up with general symmetry of parts").
106. Id. at 533. See id. at 504 (discussing the science of jurisprudence). Story then ex-
plained how the foundation of natural law is built upon:
In this manner it is that the law of nature involves a consideration of the nature,
faculties, and responsibilities of man.... It considers him as a solitary being, as a
member of a family, as a parent, and lastly, as a member of the commonwealth.
The consideration of this last relation introduces us at once to the most interesting
and important topics; the nature, objects, and end of government; the institution of
marriage; the origin of the rights of property; the nature and limits of social liberty; the
structure of civil and political rights; the authority and policy of laws; and, indeed, all
those institutions which form the defence and the ornament of civilized society.
Id. at 535.
[Vol. 50:13871414
1997] ONSET OF POSITIVISM 1415
sometimes called) universal law."107 Finally, consistent with the
dominant nineteenth-century American Protestant culture, Story
linked natural law and Christianity.108
While Story believed in natural law as the foundation of juris-
prudence, he simultaneously emphasized an instrumental and prag-
matic approach to the law. The common law, in particular, must re-
spond to the practical and commercial needs of the nation, "constantly
expanding," in Story's words, "with the exigencies of society."'10 9 For
Story, then, the principles of natural law exist separately from their
imperfect exemplfications in the low-level legal rules and judicial
decisions. The principles are universal, eternal, and foundational,
while the rules and decisions are pragmatic and progressive. As G.
Edward White suggests, Story conceived of historical "change as the
progressive unfolding of first principles." 1 ° Because the universal
principles must be applied in a multitude of concrete contexts-in
different climates, different geographies, and different economic
situations-low-level legal rules and judicial decisions necessarily
,vary from place to place."' Whereas in commercial law, according to
Story, concerns shared throughout the world ought to lead to a high
107. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution at 501 (cited in note 19). Story continued: "In
a state of nature, independent of the obligations of positive law, contracts may be formed, and
their obligatory force be complete." Id. at 501-02.
108. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 534-35 (cited in note 19). Story says:
With us, indeed, who form a part of the Christian community of nations, the law of
nature has a higher sanction, as it stands supported and illustrated by revelation.
Christianity, while with many minds it acquires authority from its coincidences with the
law of nature, as deduced from reason, has added strength and dignity to the latter by its
positive declarations.... Thus, Christianity becomes, not merely an auxiliary, but a
guide, to the law of nature; establishing its conclusions, removing its doubts, and
elevating its precepts.
Id. Story also wrote: "[Jurisprudence] searches into and expounds the elements of morals and
ethics, and the eternal law of nature, illustrated and supported by the eternal law of revelation."
Id. at 504. Additionally, Story linked Christianity and the common law: "Christianity is a part
of the common law .... There never has been a period in which the common law did not
recognize Christianity as lying at its foundations." Id. at 517.
109. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 526 (cited in note 19). Story stated:
[The common law, as a science, must be forever in progress; and no limits can be
assigned to its principles or improvements. In this respect it resembles the natural
sciences, where new discoveries continually lead the way to new, and sometimes to
astonishing, results. To say, therefore, that the common law is never learned, is almost
to utter a truism. It is no more than a declaration, that the human mind cannot compass
all human transactions. It is its true glory, that it is flexible, and constantly expanding
with the exigencies of society ....
Id.
110. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-35, at 360 (cited in note 1).
111. LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 33 (cited in note 2).
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degree of legal uniformity on an international scale, in various other
subjects, disparate interests and concerns retard uniformity, even
looking at America alone."2  The common law can be rationally sys-
tematized, but its specific rules remain forever imperfect because of
"the boundless circumstances of life.""3 As Story succinctly summa-
rized: "[The common law] is a system having its foundations in natu-
112. See Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 214-16, 223-25 (cited in note 19) (noting the high
degree of uniformity in commercial law, but stating that American jurisprudence can "never
acquire a homogenous character").
113. Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted). Story was, in one respect, inconsistent in his depiction of
the relation between natural law and positive law. While Story believed in natural law as the
foundation of jurisprudence, he also maintained that the people remain sovereign. Story noted:
"[O]ur government is emphatically a government of the people, in all its departments. It pur-
ports to be a government of laws, and not of men...." Id. at 511. See Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution at 714 (cited in note 19) ("[Constitutions] are ordained by the will of the people;
and can be changed only by the sovereign command of the people."). The implication of this
position is that positive law trumps natural law. Thus, for example, Story argued that although
the obligatory force of contracts arises from natural law, any remedy for a breach necessarily is
found in positive law. See id. at 501-03. Yet, when discussing the right of property, Story
expressly declared that the sovereignty of the people should be limited: "A government can
scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon a
legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to
require, that the rights of personal liberty, and private property should be held sacred." Id. at
511.
In an 1837 report to the Governor of Massachusetts on the possibility of codifying the
common law, Story and four other Commissioners discussed the proper method for deciding a
case not governed by statute.
[Tihe first question is, whether there is any clear and unequivocal principle of the
common law, which directly and immediately governs it, and fixes the rights of the
parties. If there be no such principle, the next question is, whether there is any principle
of the common law, which, by analogy, or parity of reasoning, ought to govern it. If
neither of these sources furnishes a positive solution of the controversy, resort is next
had (as in a case confessedly new) to the principles of natural justice which constitute the
basis of much of the common law; and if these principles can be ascertained to apply in a
full and determinate manner to all the circumstances, they are adopted, and decide the
rights of the parties. If all these sources fail, the case is treated as remediless at the
common law, and the only relief, which remains, is by some new legislation, by statute, to
operate upon future cases of the like nature.
Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 702-03 (cited in note 19).
According to this passage, natural law principles play two roles in common law decision
making. First, natural justice (or the principles of natural law) "constitute the basis" of the
common law. Id. at 702. That is, from this perspective, natural law provides a foundation for the
common law, but it is a foundation that is rarely explicitly referred to. Second, in rare cases, the
natural law principles provide the specific source for deciding a case. These situations arise only
if the common law does not already provide a source for a decision. Story and the Commissioners
gave several examples. First, if one requests and has work done for him, "a dictate of natural
justice," suggests that one should pay the value of the work done. Id. at 703. From this, the
Commissioners argued, an elaborate set of common law rules and pleadings follow. Second, if
one borrows money, "the common law, upon principles of natural justice, holds him liable to
repay it." Id. at 704.
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ral reason; but, at the same time, built up and perfected by artificial
doctrines, adapted and moulded to the artificial structure of society."
114
III. MODERN LEGAL SCIENCE
The American abandonment of natural law occurred around
the time of the Civil War for a variety of reasons. One factor contrib-
uting to this change was a growing disjunction between science and
religion, spurred greatly by the publication of Darwin's Origin of
Species in 1859.115 In jurisprudence, explicit invocations of natural
law based on revelation began to seem unscientific. In a similar vein,
Darwin's evolutionary theory facilitated the emergence of a historicist
sensibility, suggesting that society could evolve or progress endlessly
instead of merely seeking to realize preexisting natural principles.1 6
Another factor contributing to the demise of natural law was
that for years, even decades, before the Civil War, positivism had been
increasing in prestige and popularity. Regardless of the antebellum
belief in natural law, Americans since the time of the Revolution had
been firmly committed to the idea of the sovereignty of the people."
7
As Joseph Story declared in 1829: "Our government is emphatically a
government of the people, in all its departments. It purports to be a
114. Id. at 524. Likewise, Story stated that "the end of all true logic [is] the just application
of principles to the actual concerns of human life." Id. at 508-09. With regard to common law
pleading, Story wrote a treatise on pleading. Joseph Story, A Selection of Pleadings in Civil
Actions, Subsequent to the Declaration (Macanulty, 1805). He also linked an understanding of
pleading with an understanding of principles. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 83-84 (cited in
note 19) ("[P]leading has a most salutary effect in disciplining the mind for an accurate
investigation of principles.").
115. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Mentor, 1958) (first published in 1859); Stow
Persons, Evolution and Theology in America, in Stow Persons, ed., Evolutionary Thought in
America 422, 425-26 (Anchor, 1968). See Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 164, 168-
69 (cited in note 38) (noting that one orthodox Presbyterian leader considered evolution
"tantamount to atheism").
116. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 34 (cited in note 2) ("Belief in a law of principles
which transcends human attempts to discover and elucidate those principles explains the oft-
repeated statement that cases are the mere evidence of the law and not law itself."); White, The
Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-35, at 6, 374 (cited in note 1) (noting that Marshall
and his contemporaries "conceived of the past as a source of lessons, embodied in the form of first
principles"); Dorothy Ross, Modernist Social Science in the Land of the New/Old, in Dorothy
Ross, ed., Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, 1870-1930, at 171 (Johns Hopkins U.,
1994). Dorothy Ross writes: "The development of historicist thinking in the nineteenth century
is important because a shift in historical consciousness may well be the underlying ground for
the major intellectual changes that occurred in American social thought between the 1880s and
1920." Id. at 125.
117. See generally Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People (W.W. Norton, 1988).
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government of laws, and not of men.... "118 Most important, the
thrust of the idea of the sovereignty of the people-namely, that the
people are the ultimate political power and thus make the law-is
partially in tension with natural law."1 This tension occasionally
bubbled to the surface, especially within the crucible of slavery. For
example, judges sometimes upheld the legality of slavery by declaring
that law and morality are separate: Even if slavery is contrary to
morality and natural law, they reasoned, the positive law of the state
must be supreme. 2
0
The advance of the idea that the people are sovereign was
aided indirectly by the instrumental approach to judicial decision
making characteristic of the early to mid-nineteenth century. In
particular, despite its widespread acceptance, the instrumental ap-
proach eventually sparked some opposition as critics accused judges of
acting without constraint in common law cases. One concrete reaction
flowing from this criticism was a political campaign to codify the
common law. The point of the proposed codes was that, consistent
with the idea of the sovereignty of the people, legislatures and not
judges should make the law. The codification movement started in the
1820s and received its most complete consideration at the New York
State constitutional convention of 1846. In the end, New York re-
sisted the pressure to codify its legal system in toto. However, in
1848, under the leadership of David Dudley Field, the state replaced
the common law writs and forms of action with a code that mandated
pleading the facts giving rise to a cause of action. Over the next few
decades, similar codes of procedure were implemented in many other
states.'2
1
118. Story, Miscellaneous Writings at 511 (cited in note 19). Francis Hilliard added that
constitutions are the supreme law in the United States, and federal and state statutes stand
superior to the common law. Hilliard, The Elements of Law at 4-6 (cited in note 19).
119. Of course, one could assert that in theory, positivism and natural law are completely
inconsistent. The social reality of antebellum America, however, showed that natural law and
positivism could exist side by side, so long as their spheres were each sufficiently narrowed. For
example, antebellum legal science was oriented toward natural law, but Americans simultane-
ously believed that legislatures could make positive law.
120. See Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused. Antislavery and the Judicial Process 119-23
(Yale U., 1975) (discussing and giving examples of such reasoning); White, The Marshall Court
and Cultural Change 1815-35, at 681-82 (cited in note 1) (noting the Marshall Court decided
legal issues to the detriment of slaves by using positive law to limit natural law). See, for
example, The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845).
121. See Cound, Friedenthal, and Miller, Civil Procedure at 362-65 (cited in note 93)
(discussing mid-nineteenth century New York commission effort to reform the mode of pleading);
Horwitz I at 17-20, 257-58 (cited in note 1) (linking the codification movement to the increased
number of treatises written to state the "black letter" law); James and Hazard, Civil Procedure
§ 1.6 (cited in note 93) (noting that, by 1900, 27 states, particularly those west of the Mississippi,
had adopted codes of procedure); LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 71-72 (cited in note 2)
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The Protestant revivalism of the Second Great Awakening also
was intertwined with the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Before
the Second Great Awakening, many American Protestants remained
committed to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination under which God
has pre-selected a chosen few for salvation. During the nineteenth-
century Awakening, though, countless Protestants rejected the con-
cept of predestination and instead accepted the belief that the
ordinary individual was capable of choosing salvation. The populist
ideology of this theological transition was unmistakable: The people
were empowered to choose.122 Hence, this religious metamorphosis
both supported and was reinforced by the growing American political
commitment to the democratic idea of the sovereign people. Moreover,
these religious and political changes resonated with the increasingly
compelling theories of economics and political economy that stressed
the importance of the autonomous individual willfully selecting
products in a free market.123
Besides the heightening power of the idea of the sovereign
people, another factor fueling the growing significance of positivism
was the work of the English jurisprudent, John Austin. 24 A disciple of
Jeremy Bentham, Austin first published The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined in 1832, but his work became influential
only in the 1860s when it was republished posthumously.125 The
(describing the abolition of equity courts and the implementation of a single "civil action" in New
York); Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 239-65 (cited in note 1) (discussing generally the
development and debate concerning codification); Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 932-39 (cited in
note 34) (describing Field's Code); An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings, and
Proceedings of the Courts of this State, 1848 N.Y. Laws 379, §§ 118, 120. By 1897, 27 states had
adopted the Field Code and additional states had pleading systems that closely resembled the
Code. Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 939 (cited in note 34). For a discussion of the influence of
Jeremy Bentham on the American codification movement, see Miller, The Life of the Mind in
America at 243-54 (cited in note 1).
122. See Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 178-83 (cited in note 38)
(discussing the relation between democracy and the Second Great Awakening); Persons,
Evolution and Theology in America, in Persons, ed., Evolutionary Thought in America at 423-24
(cited in note 115) (describing America's increasing resistance to predestination).
123. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 76 (cited in note 2) ("[Alt least some of the legal
doctrine coming from this era should reflect the influence of the classical theories of economics
and political economy."); White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-35 at 50-51 (cited
in note 1) (noting the emergence of a belief that "self-fulfillment could best be encouraged by
allowing individuals to pursue their economic ... self-interests").
124. John Austin in Wilfrid E. Rumble, ed., John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined (Cambridge U., 1995). For a brief introduction to Austin, see Wilfred E. Rumble, ed.,
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined viii-xxiv (Cambridge U., 1995).
125. Rumble, ed., John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined at vii, xixii (cited
in note 124); Grey, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 794 (cited in note 1) (noting that Austin's theory "became
the orthodoxy of English analytical jurisprudence when Holmes was a law student").
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progenitor of analytical jurisprudence, 126 Austin explicitly and vigor-
ously attacked Blackstone's conception of natural law, which had been
so important in early nineteenth-century America. Austin wrote:
Sir William Blackstone... says in his 'Commentaries,' that the laws of God are
superior in obligation to all other laws; that no human laws should be suffered
to contradict them; that human laws are of no validity if contrary to them; and
that all valid laws derive their force from that Divine original....
Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not
binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most
pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God,
have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals.
127
Austin thus set forth his classic statement of legal positivism:
the command theory of law. "[A] law," according to Austin, "is a com-
mand which obliges a person or persons to a course of conduct."'28 In
the postbellum years, Austin's writings strongly influenced American
legal scientists as they came to grips with positivism.
129
By the time of the Civil War, then, several factors were weak-
ening the hold of natural law and increasing the sway of legal positiv-
ism in American jurisprudence. But, as a general matter, prominent
transitions in intellectual thought often seem to follow momentous
126. "Analytical jurisprudence is concerned with the logical analysis of the basic concepts
that arise in law-e.g., duty, responsibility, excuse, negligence, and the concept of law itself."
Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law 1 (Westview, 1990).
127. Austin in Rumble, ed., John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined at 157-
58 (cited in note 124). See Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts at 71 (cited in note 17)
(stating Austin's belief that only laws made by the state were binding laws); Sebok, 93 Mich. L.
Rev. at 2062-63, 2086-87 (cited in note 23) (discussing further Austin's and Bentham's argument
against Blackstone). Austin, though, defended utilitarianism by arguing, in part, that
utilitarianism corresponded with the law of God. Austin in Rumble, ed., John Austin, The
Province of Jurisprudence Determined at 41-44 (cited in note 124). On this point, Austin
departed from the teaching of Bentham. Rumble, ed., John Austin, The Province of
Jurisprudence Determined at xv (cited in note 124).
128. Austin in Rumble, ed., John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined at 29
(cited in note 124) (emphasis omitted). Austin wrote:
Every positive law (or every law simply and strictly so called) is set, directly or
circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or members of the
independent political society wherein its author is supreme. In other words, it is set,
directly or circuitously, by a monarch or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a
state of subjection to its author.
Id. at 285. See Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2064 (cited in note 2) (discussing the command theory
of law from Bentham and Austin).
129. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 76-78, 116-18 (cited in note 2) (discussing
Austin's ideas); Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2056-57 (cited in note 23) (describing the development
of positivism). For a discussion of the earlier development of positivism in European thought
(before Austin), see Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory at 271-77 (cited in note 1).
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social upheavals. 3 0  Unsurprisingly, the Civil War itself proved to be
the cataclysmic event that finally precipitated a distinct transition to
positivism. 131 Perry Miller suggests that, with the Civil War, "an era
in the history of American law, as well as an era in the history of the
American mind, was brought to an abrupt and violent conclusion."132
Most basically, the eradication of slavery and the death or maiming of
one-fourth of the young male population profoundly transformed the
social fabric of America. 33 Other factors, such as continuing industri-
alization, urbanization, and immigration, bolstered the transforma-
tion of American social structures."4
Thus, jurisprudence was just one of many areas in which the
country was being reshaped after the Civil War. In jurisprudence,
moreover, the crisis of the War helped mold the evolving shape of legal
thought. Specifically, the antebellum dispute over slavery contributed
to the disavowal of natural law. Both abolitionists and pro-slavery
advocates had invoked natural law arguments in support of their
causes. Indeed, Benjamin F. Wright argues (perhaps overzealously)
130. See, for example, Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal
Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective at 334-37 (cited in note 1)
(discussing the rise of totalitarianism and World War II in relation to American legal thought).
See Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity at 156-57 (cited in note 6) (arguing
that a sense of a need to start "from scratch" prompted the rise of philosophical modernity in
seventeenth-century Europe and the rise of modernism in the arts during the 1920s and 1930s).
131. John G. Gunnell notes that America's most influential political thinker of the mid-
nineteenth century, Francis Lieber, explicitly focused on the natural origins of the state as late
as 1858. John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory 30-31 (U. of Chicago, 1993).
132. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 206 (cited in note 1). Arthur Bestor writes:
"Into the prodigious vortex of crisis and war every current of American life had ultimately been
drawn." Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 Am. Hist. Rev.
327, 327 (1964). Helpful accounts of the Civil War include the following: William R. Brock,
Conflict and Transformation (Penguin, 1973); Bruce Catton, The Civil War (Houghton-Mifflin,
1985); Peter J. Parish, The American Civil War (Holmes & Meier, 1975).
133. Peter J. Parish calls the Civil War "the central event of American history." Parish, The
American Civil War at 13 (cited in note 132). Bruce Catton adds: "[The War] had destroyed one
of the two American ways of life forever, and it had changed the other almost beyond recogni-
tion." Catton, The Civil War at 263 (cited in note 132). See Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!,
20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 691, 702 (1995) (tracing the moral decline and political corruption of the
late nineteenth century to the tragedy of the Civil War). For an extended discussion of whether
the Civil War either caused or only symbolized the changes that the nation underwent, see
Parish, The American Civil War at 625-52 (cited in note 132).
134. For example, during the middle and later decades of the nineteenth century, the
growing significance of manufacturing combined with advances in transportation and communi-
cation to change how Northerners viewed the nation. They increasingly saw (and treated) the
nation as a single marketplace, rather than as a group of discrete geographical and cultural
regions. See Parish, The American Civil War at 27-28 (cited in note 132) (noting that the spread
of northern enterprises "reduced state boundaries almost to irrelevance"). In fact, in the 1850s,
for a time, immigration seemed equally important and equally divisive as slavery. Id. at 25-26.
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that, from 1831 onward, almost all arguments for and against slavery
were based on natural law.1 5 While natural rights can be understood
as a component of natural law, natural rights and natural law also can
be analytically separated to some degree, and in the middle decades of
the nineteenth century, such a separation had become significant.136
In the antebellum years, natural rights arguments often had been
invoked to argue against slavery: A natural right of individual liberty,
it was asserted, contravened the legal institution of slavery. 137 At the
same time, though, natural law arguments often had been invoked in
favor of slavery: Natural law, according to some, supported a particu-
lar ordering of society, with slaves supposedly entrenched in their
proper role at the bottom of the social hierarchy.'3
135. See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 211 (cited in note 17). See
generally William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-
1848 (Cornell U., 1977) (explaining the variety of antislavery arguments that were made prior to
1848).
136. See Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts at 21-27; 52-53 (cited in note 17)
(distinguishing natural rights and natural law); Wright, American Interpretations of Natural
Law at 4-12 (cited in note 17) (stating that natural law was "rarely made to be the source of a
body of rights which individuals hold even as against the state."). For a historical discussion of
the emergence of natural rights in relation to prior natural law concepts, with an emphasis on
seventeenth-century European philosophy, see Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory at
227-29, 268-70 (cited in note 1).
137. See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 211-25 (cited in note 17). See
also Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848, at 259-61
(cited in note 135) (explaining the natural law arguments of radical antislavery
constitutionalists). For example, the Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery
Convention which met in Philadelphia in December 1833, stated:
The right to enjoy liberty is inalienable. To invade it is to usurp the prerogative of
Jehovah. Every man has a right to his own body-to the products of his own labor-to
the protection of law-and to the common advantages of society. That all those laws
which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are therefore, before God, utterly
null and void; being an usurpation of the Divine prerogative, a daring infringement on
the law of nature, a base overthrow of the very foundations of the social compact... and
therefore they ought instantly to be abrogated.
Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 212 (cited in note 17).
138. See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 229-39 (cited in note 17). See
also Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848, at 138, 186
(cited in note 135) (giving illustrations of natural law arguments on the proslavery side). For
example, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, the Vice President of the Confederacy, said in his
"cornerstone speech," delivered at Savannah in 1861:
The new constitution [of the Confederacy] has put at rest, forever, all the agitating
questions relating to our peculiar institution-African slavery as it exists amongst
us--the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate
cause of the late rupture and present revolution... The prevailing ideas entertained by
[Jefferson] and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old
constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was... wrong in principle,
socially, morally, and politically.... This was an error....
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These contrasting arguments contributed to the demise of
natural law after the Civil War. Insofar as the victors take the spoils
of war, the Union's victory, in a sense, repudiated the Southern
invocations of natural law (though the Northern invocations of natural
rights were not necessarily undermined in a similar fashion).139 Not
Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid,
its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man;
that slavery-subordination to the superior race-is his natural and normal condition.
T1, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great
physical, philosophical, and moral truth.
Alexander Stephens, Cornerstone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), reprinted in Henry Cleveland,
Alexander H. Stephens, In Public and Private 721 (National, 1866). See Wright, American
Interpretations of Natural Law at 233-34 (cited in note 17) (summarizing John C. Calhoun's pro-
slavery natural law argument); Brock, Conflict and Transformation at 14 (cited in note 132)
(explaining why slave-owners accepted Calhoun's argument that slavery was necessary to a great
culture). But see Nelson, 87 Harv. L. Rev. at 538-47 (cited in note 1) (arguing that proslavery
forces used instrumental arguments). For a discussion of the factors that led Southern politi-
cians to develop increasingly elaborate and aggressive defenses of slavery, see Parish, The
Americah Civil War at 28-31 (cited in note 132).
139. Wright notes that "the concept of natural law was generally discarded, and frequently
explicitly repudiated, by American political theorists after the Civil War," Wright, American
Interpretations of Natural Law at 276 (cited in note 17), but natural rights, according to Wright,
continued to be significant in judicial decision making. Id. at 293, 298-99. Compare Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986) (suggesting reasons for the survival of natural rights arguments after
the Civil War). Other scholars sharply disagree, however, about whether natural rights reason-
ing was explicit or even implicit in some of the Supreme Court's substantive due process cases
from the late nineteenth century. Compare Moglen, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 2032-33 (cited in note
1) (arguing that the Supreme Court used natural rights reasoning) and Nelson, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
at 552-57 (cited in note 1) (same) with Horwitz H at 156-59 (cited in note 1) (arguing that
Progressives in the early twentieth century mistakenly characterized the late nineteenth-century
Supreme Court as following natural rights) and Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation,
6 Yale J. L. & Human. 137, 154 (1994) (reviewing Horwitz II (cited in note 1) (agreeing with
Horwitz on this point)) and Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-century
Constitutional Thought, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1431, 1542-43 (arguing that constitutional theorists of
the postbellum era were historist and not natural law oriented). It is worth noting, at this point,
that in a study of the law of slavery, Robert Cover characterized the early nineteenth century as
positivistic. See generally Cover, Justice Accused- Antislavery and the Judicial Process (cited in
note 120). But focusing exclusively on the slavery controversy, Cover failed to account for the
strong natural law strains of nineteenth-century legal thought. Moreover, Cover did not
adequately distinguish between nineteenth-century arguments based on natural rights and
arguments based on natural law. Compare White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change
1815-35, at 129 n.190 (cited in note 1) (criticizing Cover's characterization of the early nineteenth
century as positivist); Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2081 n.112 (cited in note 23) (criticizing Cover's
characterization of late nineteenth-century formalism as natural law oriented).
Yet, while I disagree with Cover's ultimate characterization of the early nineteenth century, I
maintain that the slavery debates and the Civil War strongly contributed to the transition from
natural law to positivism in American jurisprudence. Moreover, I agree with Cover insofar as he
suggested that, in America, the sovereignty of the people often was held out as above the natural
law. See note 120 and accompanying text (noting that judges upheld slavery by distinguishing
law and morality); note 113 (discussing Story's inconsistent messages concerning the relation
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incidentally, Lincoln and other Republican politicians, while not
averse to invoking natural rights, most often emphasized the sover-
eignty of the people---"government of the people, by the people, for the
people"--which resonated, of course, with a positivist view of the
law.140 Furthermore, the "all-or-nothing character" of natural law and
natural rights arguments, and the likelihood that such positions could
not be resolved peacefully eroded the belief in natural law.141 In the
context of the slavery dispute before the War, natural law arguments,
according to Peter J. Parish, had "put orthodox practical politics in
jeopardy."'4 In a nation becoming increasingly focused on the demo-
cratic idea of the sovereign people, such counter-political arguments
were problematic, to say the least.
The demise of natural law in postbellum America had two
intertwined consequences of enormous importance to legal thought.
First, with natural law reasoning in disrepute, legal positivism freely
ascended to supremacy in jurisprudential theory143 Thus, positivism
had helped to weaken the position of natural law in the years before
the Civil War, and then after the War, with natural law largely dis-
avowed, positivism predominated (though, judges arguably continued
between the sovereignty of the people and natural law). See, for example, Kent, 2 Commentaries
on American Law at 1 (cited in note 19) (suggesting that the protection of natural rights
depended on laws enacted by the representatives of the people). Compare Morgan, Inventing the
People 55-93 (cited in note 117) (explaining the creation of the concept of the sovereign people in
England and America).
140. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in Henry Steele
Commager and Allan Nevins, eds., The Heritage of America 764, 765 (Little, Brown, 1949). See
Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law at 175-76, 180 (cited in note 17) (stating that
Lincoln found no need to justify his tenets of democracy by an "appeal to the laws of nature");
Alexander H. Stephens, Speech on the Territorial Bill (Aug. 7, 1848), reprinted in Henry
Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, In Public and Private 346-47 (National, 1866).
141. Moglen, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 2045 (cited in note 1). See LaPiana, Logic and Experience
at 75-76 (cited in note 2) (noting that the moral discord created by the arguments of abolitionists
and their opponents undermined the belief in a widely held set of moral values). According to
Peter J. Parish, "[slavery] blew to pieces the party system, and the normal pattern of bargain and
compromise." Parish, The American Civil War at 26 (cited in note 132). To some extent, these
problems that emerged in natural law corresponded to certain criticisms of Platonic philosophy.
In particular, Plato was criticized for not adequately explaining both how we come to know Ideas
or Forms and how particular instances participate in the Ideas. See, for example, Owens, A
History of Ancient Western Philosophy at 227-28 (cited in note 64). These criticisms of Platonic
philosophy seem to relate to the standard skeptical critique of natural law: Natural law
apparently can be invoked for any position because we cannot truly know either whether there is
such a thing as natural law or, even if there is, what principles are contained in natural law. See
John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 50 (Harvard U., 1980) (stating that natural law can be
invoked "to support anything"). Part of the problem for natural law in the Civil War context was
that natural law was being invoked to support entirely inconsistent positions.
142. Parish, The American Civil War at 27 (cited in note 132). See id. at 49 (describing the
invocation of natural law arguments in congressional debates as a "dangerous precedent").
143. For an excellent analysis of the idea of positivism, see Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2063-
65 (cited in note 23).
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to use natural rights reasoning in some cases).'" Second, the interre-
lated decline of natural law and rise of positivism generated a proto-
typical modernist epistemological problem: the problem of founda-
tions. Before the Civil War, the principles of natural law had provided
a theoretical foundation for the American legal system, but this foun-
dation had suddenly dissolved. What could serve as a new founda-
tion? To be sure, the people were sovereign, and this fact justified
legislative law making. If, however, legislation rested on the ground
that it supposedly represented the sovereign will of the people, what
about judicial decisions at common law? At a time when the common
law remained the most pervasive feature of the American legal land-
scape, 145 what was the foundational source that guided and con-
strained common law judges? This metaphysical and epistemological
problem provided the agenda for American legal modernism: For at
least the next one hundred years, jurisprudents struggled to identify
an objective foundation for judicial decision making.
46
144. See note 139 and accompanying text.
145. Compare Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (Harvard U., 1984)
(discussing the transition of American legal landscape in the twentieth century so that
legislation dominated over the common law).
146. See Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in
Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective at 329-52 (cited in note 1) (explaining the four
stages of modernism as exploring different possible objective grounds for the rule of law). In a
review of Neil Duxbury's Patterns of American Jurisprudence, Gordon writes: "[If one
characterizes] the main job of modern jurisprudence... as a series of successive attempts to re-
establish more or less objective foundations for legal reasoning-in an intellectual environment
that has been irrevocably altered by skeptical attacks on such foundations-one will have found
a tolerably effective way of organizing the history of the last hundred years of legal thought."
Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and Noble
Dreams, 84 Geo. L. J. 2215, 2218 (1996) (reviewing Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence
(cited in note 1)).
I disagree with Thomas C. Grey insofar as he implicitly suggests that Langdellian legal
science is premodern. In his otherwise excellent study of Langdell, Grey refers to Langdellian le-
gal science as the "classical orthodoxy" that serves as "the indispensable foil" for "modern legal
thought." Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 3 (cited in note 1). I agree that Langdeflian legal science
serves as a foil for much of what follows in American jurisprudence, but it is not classical in the
sense of being premodern. Hence, despite serving as a foil, Langdellian legal science is also
modern, and it therefore shares much in common with the other forms of modernist
jurisprudence that followed it. Compare LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 59, 187 n.11 (cited in
note 2) (questioning whether Langdell's writing on contract law should be called classical or
orthodox). Previously, I too have used the term "classical orthodoxy." See, for example,
Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in Schwartz, ed., The
Warren Court: A Retrospective at 329 (cited in note 1). While the term usefully underscores the
importance of Langdellian legal science to American jurisprudence-as the standard or long
dominant approach to law-I now believe that the word "classical" can be misleading (as it
suggests premodern). In a more recent article, Grey himself characterizes Langdellian legal
science as modern. Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L. J. 493, 494
(1996) (reviewing Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (cited in note 1)).
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In this context, Langdellian legal science developed. Langdell
and his colleagues were the first American jurisprudents who at-
tempted to understand and legitimate the common law system in a
positivist world.147 Although Langdell did not often explicitly discuss
positivism as a theory, Langdellians clearly were committed positiv-
ists. Joseph Beale, a second-generation disciple of Langdell, main-
tained that "no principle of natural law can be regarded as
law.., until it is established as a principle of some actually living and
working system of positive law."14 At times, Langdell himself uttered
purely positivist statements. For example, he said that "[a]ll duties
originate in commands of the State,"' 49 and that the word "law", as
commonly used by attorneys, "means law as administered by courts of
justice in suits between litigating parties."15 Moreover, Langdellians
repudiated the natural law notions that legal principles are universal
and eternal. Instead, generally consistent with a positivist outlook
and a historicist (and hence modernist) sensibility, Langdellians un-
derstood legal principles as developing or evolving over time.'5 ' In the
Preface to his first casebook on contracts, published in 1871, Langdell
underscored the "growth, development, [and] establishment" of legal
147. I rely largely on the following works by Langdell: C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases
on the Law of Contracts (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1879) ("Langdell, Casebook"); C.C. Langdell, A
Summary of the Law of Contracts (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1880) ("Langdell, Summary"); C.C.
Langdell, Preface to the First Edition, in A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Little,
Brown, 2d ed. 1879) ("Langdell, Preface"); C.C. Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 Am. L.
Rev. 123 (1887); C.C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs (Part 1), 13 Harv. L. Rev. 537
(1900); C.C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs (Part IV, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 659 (1900);
C.C. Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 496 (1901);
C.C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth Century in Relation to
Legislation, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 151 (1906). I also rely on Joseph H. Beale, 1 A Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis, 1916); Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts (Baker, Voorhis,
1920); William A. Keener, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Quasi.Contracts iii (Baker, Voorhis,
1888) ("Keener, Quasi-Contracts"); William A. Keener, Methods of Legal Education (Part LO, 1
Yale L. J. 143 (1892). For a colloquy on Langdell, see 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 691 (1995).
148. Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws at 143 (cited in note 147).
149. Langdell, 13 Harv. L. Rev. at 542 (cited in note 147). Langdell, however, clearly denied
legislation the status of being true law. See Langdell, 19 Harv. L. Rev. at 153 (cited in note 147).
150. Langdell, 19 Harv. L. Rev. at 151 (cited in note 147). See LaPiana, Logic and
Experience at 122-24 (cited in note 2) (discussing evidence of Langdell's positivism). See also id.
at 124-31, 136 (discussing other Langdellian positivists).
151. William A. Keener writes: "To say that the study of cases is only the study of isolated
propositions is to deny that the law has been developed through the cases." Keener, 1 Yale L. J.
at 146 (cited in note 147) (emphasis added). See Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 28-29 & n.99 (cited
in note 1) (discussing the Langdellians' rejection of natural law and acceptance of an idea of legal
development). Compare Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2079-81 (cited in note 23) (arguing that
although Langdell sometimes is mistakenly characterized as a natural law theorist, he was
actually a positivist).
Later, I argue that although the Langdellians believed in progress in a modernist sense, they
did not completely display a historicist attitude. See text accompanying note 205.
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principles-a slow growth "extending in many cases through centu-
ries."152
152. Langdell, Preface at viii-ix (cited in note 147). See Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws at 149-50 (cited in note 147) (arguing that the common law progresses).
The significance of the so-called historical school of jurisprudence in America and its rela-
tionship to Langdellian legal science are problematic. The leading proponents of the historical
school were Friedrich Carl von Savigny, a German who published in the first part of the
nineteenth century, and Henry Maine, an Englishman who published his most famous work,
Ancient Law, in 1861. Henry Maine, Ancient Law (U. of Arizona, 1986). See Bodenheimer,
Jurisprudence at 70-83 (cited in note 1) (discussing Savigny and the development of the historical
school). According to the views of the historical school, law develops slowly as part of a national
culture. Savigny wrote:
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will be found to have
already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their language, manners
and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate existence, they are but the
particular faculties and tendencies of an individual people, inseparably united in nature,
and only wearing the semblance of distinct attributes to our view. That which binds
them into one whole is the common conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of
an inward necessity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary origin....
But this organic connection of law with the being and character of the people, is also
manifested in the progress of the times; and here, again, it may be compared with
language. For law, as for language, there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject
to the same movement and development as every other popular tendency; and this very
development remains under the same law of inward necessity, as in its earliest stages.
Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with the strength of the people, and finally
dies away as the nation loses its nationality....
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (Abram
Hayward, trans.) (1831), reprinted in Clarence Morris, ed., The Great Legal Philosophers 290,
290 (U. of Pennsylvania, 1959).
In America, the clearest proponent of the historical school was James Coolidge Carter.
Carter was a prominent New York attorney and leader of the bar who strongly opposed the
continuing efforts to codify the law in New York in the latter nineteenth century. Consequently,
except for one book published posthumously, his writing was largely "partisan and polemical"
and published as "speeches or reports in pamphlets to bar associations." Herget, American
Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: A History at 120 (cited in note 1). See Horwitz II at 118-21 (cited in
note 1) (discussing Carter's opposition to codification). See, for example, James Coolidge Carter,
Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907). In fact, Savigny himself had
drawn upon his historical approach to oppose codification in Germany earlier in the century. See
Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence at 71-73 (cited in note 1) (explaining that Savigny opposed
codification and believed that the true sources of law included the "common consciousness of the
people"). In any event, Carter's writings have had little long-term influence in American
jurisprudence. See Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: A History at 120-30 (cited in
note 1) (discussing Carter's ideas). I do not mean to suggest that the historical school was
inconsequential in America, but rather that it was of secondary importance. The historical
school's greatest significance may have been its support of the general trend in late nineteenth-
century jurisprudence toward a more historicist approach. See id. at 22 (stating that the
historical school "played not a dominant but a main supporting role in American legal
philosophy"). Compare Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 34 (cited in note 1)
(noting that Holmes drew upon the historical jurisprudence of Maine and Savigny, but otherwise
failing to discuss the historical school); Horwitz II at 121 (cited in note 1) (describing Carter as
"pedestrian"); Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 30 (cited in note 1) (noting links between Langdellian
legal science and the historical school but also emphasizing differences); Hoeflich, 30 Am. J. Leg.
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 50:1387
Most important, though, the positivist approach of Langdellian
legal scientists was exemplified in their emphasis on the decided
cases. To Langdell, the cases (or the books containing the cases) were
"the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge."153 By studying cases, the
legal scientist then could inductively discover objective legal principles
or doctrines. 54  Langdell's concept of legal science, thus, closely
correlated with his case method of teaching.1 5 The case method,
which he introduced, entailed a penetrating analysis of a series of
cases: Through a process of Socratic questioning, the professor led the
students to recognize the legal principles immanent in the cases. The
case method contrasted with the typical antebellum approach of
presenting abstract principles and rules through lectures.56 According
to Langdell's Preface to his casebook, the case method was the best
approach to teaching because the cases themselves were the "original
sources."157  The law professor was qualified to teach the students
because, as a legal scientist, he or she was experienced not in the
Hist. at 119-21 (cited in note 1) (discussing similarities between Langdellian legal science and
historical jurisprudence). Carter may have undermined his own long-term influence in American
jurisprudence by expanding his opposition to codification into a general antagonism toward
legislation, arguing that legislation was actually inconsistent with democracy. See Horwitz II at
119-20 (cited in note 1) (discussing Carter's opposition to legislation). Compare Bodenheimer,
Jurisprudence at 73 (cited in note 1) (observing that Savigny opposed most forms of legislation
also). This viewpoint obviously ran against the grain of the trend of American political thought
with its ever-increasing emphasis on the sovereignty of the people.
153. Langdell, 21 Am. L. Rev. at 124 (cited in note 147).
154. See Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws at 148-49 (cited in note 147) (arguing
that common law judges discover and do not make the law). Grey writes:
Progress occurred when the scholar (or the great judge or lawyer) discovered a previously
unrecognized principle, one that provided a simple and satisfying explanation for existing
decisions, and that at the same time reflected the slowly changing needs and conditions
of society. Such a principle, because immanent in decided cases, was already the law, so
that its articulation was an act of discovery, not one of illegitimate legislation.
Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 31 (cited in note 1).
155. Throughout Keener's essay on Methods of Legal Education, he integrates legal science
with the case method of teaching; one seems to justify the other. Keener, 1 Yale L. J. at 143
(cited in note 147). Compare LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 78 (cited in note 2) (discussing
the connection between the case method of teaching and Langdellian legal science).
156. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 29-54 (cited in note 2) (describing antebellum
legal education); Charles Warren, History of the Harvard Law School 372-74 (Da Capo, 1970)
(reprint of 1908 ed.) (describing the hostility that Langdell encountered when he introduced his
case method).
157. Langdell, Preface at ix (cited in note 147). Keener wrote similarly: "The case system
then proceeds on the theory that law is a science and, as a science, should be studied in the
original sources, and that the original sources are the adjudged cases .... " Keener, 1 Yale L. J.
at 144 (cited in note 147).
1428
1997] ONSET OF POSITIVISM 1429
practice of law but rather in the learning of law-in the discovery of
the principles from the cases.
158
Hence, two central features of Langdellian legal science were a
positivist focus on the decided cases and the use of inductive reason to
discover legal principles. Yet, the most salient feature of the postbel-
lum approach was its commitment to deductive reason or logic.
Indeed, Langdell's practice of legal science was remarkably Cartesian
in style. Whereas the antebellum legal scientists rather faithfully
accepted the multitude of cases, the Langdellian scientist applied a
method of doubt or skepticism reminiscent of Descartes. 159 Langdell
explicitly turned his skeptical gaze on case precedents: "[Tihe cases
which are useful and necessary for [the purpose of legal study] at the
present day bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been
reported. The vast majority are useless, and worse than useless, for
any purpose of systematic study."16 Langdell and his colleagues then
applied deductive reason with the dogged ferocity of a Cartesian in a
158. Langdell wrote:
[I]f printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge, if every student who
would obtain any mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate sources, and
if the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive is such as can be
afforded by teachers who have traveled the same road before him,-then a university,
and a university alone, can afford every possible facility for teaching and learning law. I
wish to emphasize the fact that a teacher of law should be a person who accompanies his
pupils on a road which is new to them, but with which he is well acquainted from having
often traveled it before. What qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law, is not
experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not
experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but
experience in learning law ....
Langdell, 21 Am. L. Rev. at 123-24 (cited in note 147). Keener suggested that the virtue of the
case method of teaching lay more in the fact that it supposedly forced students to do what
attorneys do in the practice of law. Keener, Preface at iv (cited in note 147). Of course,
Langdell's and Keener's respective views of the advantages of the case method were not
inconsistent. One could easily argue that the case method taught students what they would need
to do as attorneys, and as attorneys they would need to learn the law from the cases.
159. See Rene Descartes, Meditations (1641) (John Veitch, trans.), reprinted in The
Rationalists 97, 112-27 (Anchor, 1974) (describing and using the method of doubt). Descartes
expected to locate the fundamental and indubitable truths, the foundations of human
knowledge, within the mind, buried or hidden under the debris of prejudices and
opinions. He expected to locate these by the very process of doubting .... By doubting
and negating, these opinions and beliefs that, at present, blind us, he said, could be
removed so that truth would shine forth.
Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza at 182-83 (cited in note 6).
160. Langdell, Preface at viii (cited in note 147). See Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws at 148-49 (cited in note 147) (explaining that many cases are wrongly decided and therefore
not truly law). Some of Langdell's disciples did not display quite the same enthusiasm as
Langdell himself for repudiating large numbers of cases. See Duxbury, Patterns of American
Jurisprudence at 21-23 (cited in note 1) (discussing changes made to the Langdellian approach by
Williston, Keener, and Ames).
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quest to conceptualize a logically coherent and (hopefully) elegant
system of legal principles and rules. "Law, considered as a science,
consists of certain principles or doctrines," Langdell declared.
1 1
"Moreover, the number of fundamental legal [principles or] doctrines
is much less than is commonly supposed .... If these doctrines could
be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their
number."162 Stephen Toulmin tersely comments that, for Descartes,
"abstract axioms were in, concrete diversity was out."'' s The same
could be said of Langdell. Legal principles were analogous to the
axioms of Euclidian geometry: 6 4 They were few in number, they could
be classified and arranged into a formal system, and they served as
the fountainhead for the logical deduction of all other legal rules.
Langdellians neatly and rationally ordered the entire legal system
into a conceptual framework resembling a pyramid, with the few
axiomatic and abstract principles at the apex of the pyramid and more
precise and numerous rules at the base.165 Those case precedents that
did not fit neatly into the formal and conceptual framework were
deemed wrong and therefore irrelevant.
161. Langdell, Preface at viii (cited in note 147). See Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws at 135 (cited in note 147) (noting that law "is not a mere collection of arbitrary rules, but a
body of scientific principle").
162. Langdell, Preface at viii-ix (cited in note 147). In a similar vein, Langdell added:
It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts,
for example, and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify,
and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth,
development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines; and that such a work
could not fail to be of material service to all who desire to study that branch of law
systematically and in its original sources.
Id. at ix.
163. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity at 33 (cited in note 6)
(emphasis omitted).
164. Friedman, A History of American Law at 617-18 (cited in note 1); Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. at 16-20 (cited in note 1) (discussing the analogy between legal science and geometry).
LaPiana notes, however, that at one point, Langdell said that legal science was not like
mathematics. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 56-57 (cited in note 2). Regardless of this
statement by Langdell, in order to elucidate postbellum legal science, it is usefully analogized to
Euclidean geometry.
165. Grey has suggested that the Langdellian legal system was comprehensive, complete,
formal, and conceptually ordered. Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 6-10 (cited in note 1). A legal
system is comprehensive if it has no procedural gaps and every case gets decided. It is complete
if it has no substantive gaps and every case has a preexisting substantively correct answer. It is
formal if the result in every case is indubitably deduced through unquestionable or at least
compelling reasoning. It is conceptually ordered if "its substantive bottom-level rules can be
derived from a small number of relatively abstract principles and concepts, which themselves
form a coherent system." Id. at 8. Lasswell and McDougal described Langdellianism as having
"beautifully terraced unified statements, geometrically laid out with no overlapping, erosion or
gaps." Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L. J. 203, 237 (1943).
ONSET OF POSITIVISM
The Langdellians' commitment to logic and deductive reason-
ing produced two interrelated consequences. First, analytical or
logical soundness was the sole criterion for proper legal reasoning; a
judge, therefore, was not to consider the justice or injustice likely to
flow from a decision. Second, the overt pragmatic and instrumental
judicial decision making characteristic of the first part of the nine-
teenth century was repudiated; practical (or policy) considerations
supposedly would infect the logical purity that distinguished valid
legal reasoning.1' These two consequences are well illustrated by
Langdell's discussion of the mailbox rule-which specifies whether a
posted acceptance of an offer for a bilateral contract is effective upon
dispatch or receipt. In his Summary of the Law of Contracts, Langdell
explained that an acceptance of an offer for a bilateral contract con-
tains an implicit counter-offer. 167  By analytical definition, any
counter-offer must be communicated because "communication to the
offeree is of the essence of every offer."'6 Therefore, as a matter of
deductive logic, an acceptance (as a counter-offer) that is mailed
through the post cannot become effective until it is communicated or,
in other words, received. 169 Having concluded his syllogistic proof that
a posted acceptance must be effective only upon receipt, Langdell
proceeded to refute the common arguments in favor of deeming the
acceptance effective upon dispatch.170 The final such argument con-
fronted by Langdell was that his recommended rule-that acceptance
be effective only upon receipt-would lead to injustice and practical
absurdities. His response was striking: 'The true answer to this
argument is, that it is irrelevant."'1
7
166. Joseph Beale wrote: "Purity of doctrine may be lost through wrong decisions of courts,
thus warping legal principle by bad precedent; but wrong decisions are after all uncommon, and
the law is not seriously affected by them." Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws at 135
(cited in note 147).
167. Langdell, Summary at 15 (cited in note 147). Langdell explained that the conceptuali-
zation of an acceptance of a bilateral contract as containing a counter-offer is implied, but he did
not explain clearly why such an implication must follow. See id. at 14. Holmes criticized
Langdel on exactly this point. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 305-06 (Little,
Brown, 1991).
168. Langdell, Summary at 15 (cited in note 147).
169. Id. Langdell then explained that in all but three cases, the discussions of the mailbox
rule had been dicta. Id. at 16-18.
170. Id. at 18-21.
171. Id. at 21. After this assertion, Langdell continued his discussion of justice: "[Blut,
assuming it to be relevant, it may be turned against those who use it without losing any of its
strength." Id. He then argued that deeming an acceptance to be effective upon dispatch would
lead to greater injustice. Because of this more practical argument, Thomas Grey has suggested
that Langdell's initial response-that a focus on justice was irrelevant-was "an intentional
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To the Langdellian legal scientist, in short, legal problems were
to be resolved by carefully attending to the precise analytical defini-
tions of principles and rules and the logical consequences flowing
ineluctably from those principles and rules. Although the axiomatic
principles initially had to be induced from the cases, once inferred, the
principles themselves were the substance of the law. As William A.
Keener, one of Langdell's leading disciples, stated: "[Tihe case is
simply material from which a principle is to be extracted.172 In post-
bellum legal science, then, the principles and deductive logic stood
preeminent. 173
Unsurprisingly, Langdellian legal science did not display the
same bottom-up style of reasoning typical of antebellum legal science.
jurisprudential flourish." Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 4 n.11 (cited in note 1). I believe that
Langdell's express language suggests that Grey has overstated this point. First, when deeming
justice to be irrelevant, Langdell declared that this was the "true answer." Second, when
beginning his discussion of justice and practical concerns, Langdell suggested that he was
offering these thoughts merely as an "even if' type of argument: Even if you do not accept my
first argument (which is the true answer), you might be convinced by this additional argument.
Hence, Langdell initiated his discussion of justice by saying, "but, assuming it to be relevant."
Langdell, Summary at 21 (cited in note 147).
Langdell structured his discussion of the revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract in a
similar fashion. He first argued that, because the performance of the consideration turns an
offer for unilateral contract into a binding promise, up to "the moment when the performance of
the consideration is completed.., the offer may either be revoked, or be destroyed by the death
of the offeror, and the offeree thus be deprived of any compensation for what he has done." Id. at
3. In other words, until the offeree has completely performed, the offeror can revoke the offer,
and the offeree has no remedy. After making this analytical argument, Langdell (as in the
mailbox rule discussion) then turned to considerations of justice. He added that because "this
may cause great hardship and practical injustice," some commentators have argued that the offer
should become irrevocable once performance has begun. Langdell rejects this argument by
maintaining that "such a view seems to have no principle to rest upon." Id. at 4 (emphasis
added). That is, to Langdell, justice itself is not a principle that can ground legal argument. He
then continued by offering another "even if' argument revolving around practical concerns and
justice: "Besides, there may be hardship on the other side as well." Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
172. LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 135 (cited in note 2) (quoting William A. Keener, The
Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 Am. Bar Assoc. Rpts. 473, 484 (1994)). LaPiana
identifies Keener and James Barr Ames as Langdell's main disciples. See id. at 3.
173. Grey's comparison of Langdellian legal science with Euclidean geometry elucidates the
significance of deductive reasoning:
To capture the parallel between classical legal science and geometry, we must lay aside
the modem school-taught view that Euclidean geometry, like other mathematical
theories, is simply an uninterpreted formal system of terms and inference rules. We
must go back to the view people held for over two thousand years, and which all of us
who are not specialists in relativity theory or philosophers of mathematics still
intuitively accept. We believe that Euclid's axioms are not merely human constructs, but
rather obvious and indubitable physical truths about the structure of space, from which
nonobvious truths (like the Pythagorean theorem) can be proved by sequences of
indubitable deductive steps. It is the breathtaking nature of this movement from truisms
to new knowledge about the world through pure thought that has made Euclidean
geometry the great paradigm of the power of reason throughout the history of the West.
Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 17-18 (cited in note 1).
ONSET OF POSITIVISM
As discussed earlier, antebellum treatises usually reflected the narrow
factual situations in which cases repeatedly arose as well as the minu-
tiae of the writs or forms of action. In contrast, postbellum legal sci-
entists tended to display a top-down style of reasoning. As mentioned,
code pleading already had replaced the common law forms of action in
many states (including New York, where Langdell had practiced).
Consequently, whereas antebellum legal scientists had viewed the
forms of action as shaping the classification of the common law,
Langdellians had freedom to move to higher levels of abstraction in
their classificatory systems. Indeed, Langdellians were compelled to
search the cases for other organizational themes.7 4 The new organ-
izational themes that emerged were the high-level axiomatic princi-
ples such as consideration and mutual consent (offer and acceptance)
in contract law. The centrality of these principles was evident in
Langdellian casebooks and treatises.175  For example, in Samuel
Williston's treatise, The Law of Contracts, the principles no longer
merely provided a loose organizational scheme; rather they were the
core of the entire project-the substantive fountainhead for the logical
derivation of each chapter and section.176 Langdell's own Summary of
the Law of Contracts, a short treatise-like work, focused on the analy-
sis of contract principles; it contained remarkably few citations and
discussions of cases. 77  Indeed, in their articles and treatises, the
Langdellian legal scientists tended to eschew discussing actual cases,
especially avoiding factual details. Instead, to illustrate their main
174. See LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 4, 58, 104 (cited in note 2) (discussing the impor-
tance of the repudiation of the common law forms of action).
175. See, for example, Joseph H. Beale, Jr., A Selection of Cases and Other Authorities Upon
Criminal Law (Harvard U., 1894); William A. Keener, A Selection of Cases on the Law of
Contracts (Baker, Voorhis, 1898); Keener, Quasi-Contracts (cited in note 147); Langdell,
Casebook (cited in note 147).
176. See Williston, The Law of Contracts (cited in note 147) (containing, for example,
chapters on acceptance, consideration, and capacity).
177. See Langdell, Summary (cited in note 147); LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 59-60
(cited in note 2) (discussing differences between Langdells Summary and antebellum treatises
on contract law). To some extent, Langdell's failure to extensively cite and discuss cases might
be explained by the nature of his Summary. It was first published as a supplement to the second
edition of his casebook on contracts, and hence was intended to be used in conjunction with the
casebook. Langdell, Summary at iii (cited in note 147). The casebook, though, actually contained
very few cases when compared with an antebellum treatise. See Langdell, Casebook (cited in
note 147). Moreover, Langdel's articles demonstrated an unwavering commitment to focusing
on abstract principles and logic at the expense of extensive discussions of cases. See, for exam-
ple, Langdell, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 496 (cited in note 147). Some Langdellians, though, did fill
their treatises with footnotes full of case cites. See, for example, Williston, The Law of Contracts
(cited in note 147).
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points, the Langdellians constructed hypothetical situations purified
of irrelevant factual distractions and populated by depersonalized
legal actors called A, B, and C.178
If, as I suggest, the Langdellians were the first American
jurisprudents to confront the metaphysical and epistemological prob-
lems of legal modernism, then their proffered solutions seem, at least
on first glance, to be riddled with conundrums. The Langdellians'
strong commitment to formal deductive reasoning would appear to fit
best within a natural law system, where judges could, in theory, rea-
son deductively downward from the higher law principles to properly
resolve particular cases. But the Langdellians repudiated natural
law. In a positivist world, where law is the command of the sovereign,
judges would seem to be able to make law. Yet most Langdellians
denied that judges had such power. The axiomatic principles of the
common law, according to the Langdellians, were to be initially dis-
covered by reasoning inductively upward from the cases, but the cor-
rectness or incorrectness of the cases was to be determined by reason-
ing deductively downward from the principles. As Thomas Grey ob-
serves, the enterprise "seems to be circular."'179 Instead of successfully
specifying the metaphysical and epistemological foundations that
modernism demands, the Langdellians seemed to offer no more than a
circular system floating in mid-air.
Despite appearances, though, these tensions within
Langdellian legal science can be reconciled, to some degree. To be
clear, I do not intend to justify or legitimate the Langdellian approach
to jurisprudence. Rather, I wish to explain how it made sense, at least
178. See, for example, Williston, The Law of Contracts § 102a (cited in note 147); James
Barr Ames, Novation, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 192 (1892); Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Gratuitous
Undertakings, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 230 (1891). The Langdellians typically would cite to the real
cases in footnotes.
Williston, for one, included at least a couple of sections ostensibly containing illustrations
from cases. See, for example, Williston, The Law of Contracts §§ 74-75 (cited in note 147). Such
sections, however, were extremely rare. Moreover, they were brief and avoided any detailed dis-
cussions of cases.
179. Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 21 (cited in note 1). Grey writes: "Decisions are thought
authoritative in orthodox legal theory because they follow from the rules and principles that
constitute the law; but in the classical conception of legal science, the rules and principles
constituting the common law are themselves inductively derived from the cases. The enterprise
thus seems to be circular... " Id. Elsewhere, Grey added: "[Langdell's legal science] claims to
be empirical and yet its practice is highly conceptual; it delivers normative judgments, yet
proclaims the positivist autonomy of law from morals. This seems to be an incomprehensible
jumble of induction with deduction and of norm with fact." Id. at 16. These apparent
conundrums within Langdellian legal science led Anthony Sebok to claim that Langdell focused
almost exclusively on inductive logic, not on deductive logic. See Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2083-
84 (cited in note 23). As is clear from my interpretation of Langdellian legal science, I disagree
with Sebok's argument on this point.
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to Langdellians. My explanation emerges from an analogy: If
antebellum legal scientists were fruitfully compared to Plato, then
postbellum legal scientists can be usefully analogized to Aristotle.'8°
Whereas Plato argued that the Ideas or Forms exist independently
and separately from the particular instances, Aristotle argued that
form differs from matter only in meaning. David Ross pinpoints the
distinction between Plato and Aristotle: "Are universals, as Plato
claimed in his ideal theory, self-subsistent substantial
entities?... Aristotle answers with a firm negative."181 According to
Aristotle, form and matter (or universals and particulars) are
inseparable in fact: Form is immanent in and exists only through
concrete particulars or manifestations.1s2 The true meaning of a thing
is its form, but this meaning must be embodied in matter if it is to
exist. 183 To be sure, the forms are "for Aristotle as real, as objective, as
the individuals."'8 They are not, in other words, mere mental
constructs, but at the same time, they exist only as manifested in or as
characteristic of the particular instances. In short, one "must not
posit a separate world of universals.' ' 5 Hence, for example, the form
of good or love does not exist apart from its particular manifestations,
yet the meanings of these forms can be discussed and analyzed as
universals or principles.186
180. Years ago, (1984-85), I took a jurisprudence class from Thomas Grey. I remember that,
in the midst of a class discussion of Langdell, another student (I do not remember the student's
name) suggested, without elaboration, that Langdell was like Aristotle. Professor Grey
responded, again without elaboration, that he too had thought of that analogy. I have no idea
what they were specifically thinking about at the time. Their brief exchange may or may not
have corresponded with the substance of my comparison of Langdellian legal science and
Aristotelian philosophy (to follow in the text). In any event, my decision to use Aristotle to
elucidate postbellum legal science probably somehow relates to my memory of that class. Helpful
accounts of Aristotelian philosophy are in the following: Owens, A History of Ancient Western
Philosophy (cited in note 64); Ross, Aristotle (cited in note 66).
Richard Posner has described Langdellian legal science as "a form of Platonism." Richard A.
Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 762
(1987). Although I believe that such an analogy is understandable, it is nonetheless misleading.
181. Ross, Aristotle at 157 (cited in note 66).
182. See Aristotle, Natural Science, reprinted in Philip Wheelwright, trans., Aristotle 3, 17-
18, 23 (Odyssey, 1951). Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, reprinted in Philip
Wheelwright, trans., Aristotle 155, 162-66 (Odyssey, 1951) (rejecting Plato's theory of Ideas or
Forms).
183. Aristotle, Metaphysics, reprinted in Philip Wheelwright, trans., Aristotle 65, 77-78
(Odyssey, 1951) ("Aristotle, Metaphysics'); Aristotle, Psychology (De Anima), reprinted in Philip
Wheelwright, trans., Aristotle 115, 120-21 (Odyssey, 1951) ("Aristotle, Psychology").
184. Ross, Aristotle at 158 (cited in note 66).
185. Id.
186. Aristotle, Psychology at 120-21 (cited in note 183); Ross, Aristotle at 191 (cited in note
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If the metaphysical foundation, in a sense, consists of form and
matter together, then how does one come to knowledge? 1 7 How, that
is, does one move from sense perception of matter (or particulars) to
knowledge of forms (or universals)? Aristotle wrote: "[T]hese states of
knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed
from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception. It
is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and
then another, until the original formation has been restored."18 To
Aristotle, in other words, one initially perceives or experiences a series
of particulars and then reasons inductively upward to discover the
forms. Yet, despite Aristotle's stress on experience and inductive
logic, he also was renowned for his passion for hierarchical classifica-
tory schemes relying heavily on deductive logic. 8 9 The highest prin-
ciples or forms served as the premises (or fountainheads) for his de-
ductively derived classificatory frameworks. 9° In addition, Aristotle's
intricate hierarchical and logical systems necessarily centered on
forms rather than matter; forms could be logically related to each
other and arranged conceptually, while matter contained the particu-
lar variations that would foil such logical organization.19'
The Aristotelian relationship between form and matter illumi-
nates the relation between cases and principles in Langdellian legal
187. Aristotle did not clearly explain the exact metaphysical relationship between form and
matter. See Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy 26-27 (St. Martins, 2d ed. 1984).
188. Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy at 303 (cited in note 64) (quoting
Aristotle). See Aristotle, Metaphysics at 68 (cited in note 183); Aristotle, Zoology, reprinted in
Philip Wheelwright, trans., Aristotle 105, 109-10 (Odyssey, 1951) (Aristotle, Zoology); Ross,
Aristotle at 54-55 (cited in note 66) (describing Aristotle's theory on the development from sense
to knowledge). Compare Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind at 56 (cited in note 6)
(discussing Aristotle's emphasis on perceptible qualities and its relation to his doctrine of
categories).
189. See Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of Science at 7-8 (cited in note 38) (describing
Bacon's attacks on Aristotelian orthodoxy); David W. Hamlyn, A History of Western Philosophy
60-62, 66-71 (Penguin, 1989); Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind at 62, 263, 273 (cited in
note 6) (noting Bacon's criticism of Aristotle's reliance on deductive logic). Compare Ross,
Aristotle at 54-55, 154 (cited in note 66) (discussing Aristotle's conception of how we move from
sense perception to the highest forms of knowledge). Aristotle argued that "the ideal of a
complete science [was] a set of truths [that were] represented as a sequence of consequences
drawn from a few basic postulates or common principles." David Charles, Aristotle, in Ted
Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 53, 54 (Oxford U., 1995). For a discussion
of Aristotle's development of the concepts of deductive (or syllogistic) logic and inductive logic, see
Ross, Aristotle at 20-61 (cited in note 66). Aristotle himself actually used the term "analytics"
instead of "logic." Id. at 20.
190. See, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics at 67-104 (cited in note 183); Aristotle, Zoology
at 107-13 (cited in note 188). Compare Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy at 303-
04 (cited in note 64) (discussing the original premises for all demonstrative knowledge).
191. In the words of Ross: "[Llogic is a study of thought, and that which the individual
contains over and above its specific nature is due to the particular matter in which it is embod-
ied, and thus eludes thought." Ross, Aristotle at 24 (cited in note 66).
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science. In contrast to antebellum legal science, Langdellians did not
posit the existence of principles as separate and independent from
case decisions. Instead, the legal principles and the cases were under-
stood as inseparable in fact. Just as Aristotle argued that form is
immanent in and exists only through concrete particulars or manifes-
tations, Langdellians argued that principles are immanent in and
exist only through cases. Keener explicitly declared that law is "a
science consisting of a body of principles to be found in the adjudged
cases."'192 Thus, for Langdellians, legal principles are real and objec-
tive-their meanings can be discussed and analyzed-but they none-
theless exist only as they are embodied or manifested in the cases.
93
When Keener explained the case method of teaching, he alluded to
this metaphysical intermingling of cases and principles: By reading
cases, "[i]nstead of reading principles [in treatises]," he said, the stu-
dent "is studying and investigating the principles themselves."'194 The
metaphysical foundation for the common law, in other words, consists
of principles and cases together.
If so, then how did the legal scientist move from the cases to
knowledge of the principles? Continuing with the analogy to
Aristotelian philosophy, the legal scientist studied a series of cases
and then reasoned inductively upward to discover the principles.
Once discovered, however, these high-level principles served as the
fountainhead for chains of deductive logic, reasoning downward to
generate precisely classified and arranged formal systems. Thus,
despite having its origins in the concrete cases, the intricate legal
systems of the Langdellians revolved around abstract principles and
rules. The epistemological foundation for the common law, then, was
initially the cases, but primarily the axiomatic principles and deduc-
tive reason.195
192. Keener, 1 Yale L. J. at 144 (cited in note 147) (emphasis added); accord Keener, Quasi-
Contracts at iii.iv (cited in note 147).
193. Beale argued that the principles of the "Common Law" truly existed, but only insofar as
they "came into existence" by their acceptance as the positive law (or "common law") of particular
jurisdictions. See Beale, 1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws at 138-39, 144 (cited in note 147).
194. Keener, 1 Yale L. J. at 144 (cited in note 147).
195. The analogy between Aristotelian philosophy and Langdellian legal science reinforces
the idea that Langdellianism also can be usefully compared to Euclidean geometry. See note 164
and accompanying text. Euclid lived a generation after Aristotle, but the elementary concepts of
geometry already were known during Aristotle's time. Euclid then augmented those concepts.
Aristotle's account of the logic and presuppositions of science corresponded closely with Euclid's
eventual account of geometry. Ross, Aristotle at 44-45 (cited in note 66).
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A couple of points are worth elaborating. First, as was also
true of antebellum legal science, the postbellum legal scientists did
not endorse any form of nominalism, which would have suggested that
nothing existed but the individual case decisions. Despite the initial
focus on cases-which spurred the case method of teaching-the
Langdellians stressed the discovery of principles supposedly
immanent in the cases. As Keener suggested, legal science does "not
proceed on the theory that the law consists of an aggregation of
cases." 96
Second, in Aristotelian philosophy, a passion for deductive logic
led to a focus on forms (or universals) rather than matter, and like-
wise, in Langdellian legal science, a passion for deductive logic led to a
focus on principles and rules rather than cases. Taken one step fur-
ther, the zealous commitment to deductive logic combined, in a sense,
with the conception of legal principles as real and objective to legiti-
mate (albeit perversely) a disregard for justice and practical consid-
erations that otherwise might appear central to deciding cases.
Langdellians perhaps realized implicitly that the relation between
abstract propositions (rules and principles) and social reality (justice
and practical concerns) was problematic in at least one important
respect: To talk of a- purely deductive logical relationship between
rules and principles, on the one hand, and social reality, on the other,
did not necessarily make sense. Yet, it did make sense to talk of a
logical relationship between different abstract propositions, that is,
between different rules and principles. Therefore, when Langdellians
insisted that elements of social reality such as justice and practical
concerns should be irrelevant to the law, their emphasis on logical
order as pivotal to understanding the legal system at least became
plausible. At a minimum, we can imagine a legal system based on
abstract reason if it is unconnected to social reality.197
196. Keener, 1 Yale L. J. at 144 (cited in note 147) (emphasis added). Precisely, when
making this statement, Keener was focusing on the case method of teaching, but his comments
were derived from his conception of legal science. Although the Langdellians did not believe that
an initial focus on cases led to nominalism, one could reasonably argue that this focus on cases
eventually led to the emergence of American legal realism in the early twentieth century. See,
for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 12 (Oceana, 1951) (arguing that the study of
law requires focusing on many concrete instances). Furthermore, some critics of the realists
accused them of being nominalists because of their insistence on focusing on individual cases.
See, for example, Morris R. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1916)'
(criticizing the use of so-called "eternal principles").
197. Compare Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, in Dennis M. Patterson, ed., Wittgenstein
and Legal Theory 189, 193 (Westview, 1992) (rule-rule relations can be logical, but rule-world
relations cannot be). Of course, the possibility of imagining such a legal system does not mean




The analogies of antebellum legal science to Platonic philoso-
phy, on the one hand, and postbellum legal science to Aristotelian
philosophy, on the other hand, help to elucidate some of the puzzling
metaphysical and epistemological components of nineteenth-century
American jurisprudence. 198 For the antebellum period, the framework
of Platonic philosophy illuminates how jurisprudents deemed eternal
and universal natural law principles to be the foundation of the com-
mon law system, yet simultaneously advocated instrumental and
pragmatic decision making, particularly to promote commerce. For
the postbellum period, the framework of Aristotelian philosophy
reveals how jurisprudents believed legal science should start with a
positivist focus on cases, but simultaneously emphasized axiomatic
principles and deductive logic. Moreover, the distinction between
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies underscores that a central
transition from antebellum to postbellum jurisprudence was the
movement from a natural law to a positivist orientation.
To be sure, Langdellians did not consciously think of them-
selves as Aristotelians any more than the antebellum jurisprudents
thought of themselves as Platonists. And with regard to the postbel-
lum period, despite the usefulness of analogizing to Aristotelianism,
Langdellian jurisprudence clearly was not identical to Aristotelian
philosophy; there were large and significant differences. Aristotle
believed that nature was teleological and encompassed moral and
aesthetic values,'9 while the Langdellians did not. Unsurprisingly,
198. In discussing the apparent circularity of Langdellian legal thought, Grey argues that
some Langdellians suggested that stare decisis solved the problem of foundations in jurispru-
dence because it "provided an outside source of validity." Grey, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 26 (cited in
note 1). Grey writes:
Under the classical view of precedent, a decision or two that is out of whack with
'principle' might be set aside as 'not good authority,' though never entirely dismissed
from consideration until overruled. But an established line of precedent, however
inconsistent with 'principle' in its inception, becomes binding law, and the seamless web
of doctrine must somehow be rearranged to accommodate it.
Id. at 25-26. While this position seems to accurately describe the Langdellian belief in induction,
it does not seem to explain or solve the problem of circularity. Instead, it merely represented a
momentary privileging of induction over deduction in the Langdellian scheme. That is, stare
decisis is based on the idea that decided cases become authoritative, and from the Langdellian
world view, they therefore justified and necessitated whatever principles could be induced from
them. As Grey acknowledges, though, this privileging of induction is in tension with the
Langdellian commitment to axiomatic principles and deductive logic. See id. at 26-27.
199. Dupr6, Passage to Modernity at 17-18 (cited in note 6). See Tarnas, The Passion of the
Western Mind at 274 (cited in note 6) (stating Aristotle believed that "nature possessed teleologi-
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then, Aristotle believed in natural law and justice,2° while of course,
the Langdellians were positivists. Aristotle had faith in the veracity
of appearances and our perceptions, 201 while Langdellians doubted
and, in fact, explicitly repudiated many cases. In short, Aristotle was
premodern, and the Langdellians were modern.
Yet, the important similarities between the modernist
Langdellian legal science and the premodernist Aristotelian philoso-
phy not only help elucidate the otherwise puzzling tensions within
Langdellian jurisprudence, but also signal a resemblance between
antebellum (premodern) and postbellum (modern) legal science. 20 2 For
example, while Langdellians tended to avoid discussing actual cases
in the text of their articles and treatises, they nonetheless sometimes
filled their footnotes with citations, just as the antebellum treatise
writers had done.203 Furthermore, legal scientists during both the
antebellum and postbellum periods emphasized high-level principles,
albeit different kinds of principles, as natural law principles gave way
to inductively derived positivist axioms. Most important, regardless of
the distinction between the respective types of principles, both ante-
bellum and postbellum legal scientists conceived of the common law as
a rational system of principles. James Gould's statement, uttered in
1822, could easily have been made by a Langdellian in 1880:
cal purposes and archetypal essences"). Compare Ross, Aristotle at 159 (cited in note 66) (noting
that Aristotle believed that intelligence moved the planets). For example, Aristotle argued that
the telos, or natural end of human life, is eudaimonia, or happiness, and that one achieves
happiness by living a life in accordance with virtue. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (Philip
Bywater, trans.), reprinted in J. Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle 1729, at bk. I
(Princeton U., 1984) ("Aristotle, Ethics"). Dupr6 aptly notes that Aristotle had a "normative
concept of nature." Dupr6, The Passion of the Western Mind at 28 (cited in note 6). Such a
normative notion of nature became problematic in early Christendom and was outright rejected
in the Calvinist Reformation. Nature then was completely separated from spirit so that nature
became merely material. See Feldman, Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas at 69-78 (cited
in note 38).
200. See Aristotle, Ethics at bk. V, ch. 7 (cited in note 199). Compare Aristotle, The Politics
(Carnes Lord, trans.) at bk. I, ch. 5 (3. of Chicago, 1984) (arguing that some individuals are by
nature marked for subjection and others for ruling). J.M. Kelly argues that Aristotle weakly
described natural law. See Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory at 20-21 (cited in note
1).
201. See Duprd, Passage to Modernity at 26-27 (cited in note 6). Duprd writes:
[The modem [dismissal of appearance] stems from a loss of faith, not only in the
trustworthiness of appearances but even in the very powers of knowledge. Rather than
doubt them, Aristotle justifies appearances through themselves. He is a thorough
empiricist, but his empiricism, unlike that of seventeenth-century philosophers, rather
than being derived from doubt, is rooted in a total trust of the order of nature.
Id. at 27.
202. See Hoeflich, Law and Geometry at 108-21 (cited in note 1) (discussing the idea of legal
science in antebellum and postbellum periods).
203. See, for example, Williston, The Law of Contracts § 102 n.13 (cited in note 147) (citing
over 20 cases for the proposition that consideration must consist of a detriment or benefit).
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The object in some measure peculiar to my plan of instruction, is to teach the
law-the common law, especially-not as a collection of insulated positive
rules... but as a system of connected, rational principles: for, such the
common law unquestionably is, not only in its fundamental and more





The strong similarities between antebellum and postbellum
legal science suggest that the Langdellians, as the first modernist
American jurisprudents, failed in some ways to fully grasp the signifi-
cance of the movement away from premodernism. While the
Langdellians believed in progress in a modernist sense-the common
law, they argued, slowly evolved-they did not completely incorporate
a historicist attitude.205  From the Langdellian perspective, after all,
judges could not just instrumentally make the law for the utility of
society. In speaking of postbellum intellectual trends, in general,
Dororthy Ross argues that "the mentality of the [1880s] was typically
'utopian' and in basic ways characteristic of the thought earlier in the
nineteenth century."=" This description of the postbellum period aptly
fits the Langdellians: Although the Langdellians believed that the
common law progresses, they seemed utopian in their efforts to
conceive of the common law as a perfectly logical and conceptually
ordered system. Perhaps, for that reason, some commentators
mistakenly have assumed that the Langdellians were natural law
theorists, since reasoning deductively downward from axiomatic
principles seems implicitly to suggest a natural law orientation. 207 But
of course, the Langdellians were positivists: The tension between
their positivism and their ostensible natural law orientation-the
focus on principles and logic-is reconciled, at least in part, by
204. Miller, The Life of the Mind in America at 156 (cited in note 1) (quoting James Gould,
The Law School at Litchfield, United States Law Journal (1822)) (emphasis omitted). Langdelrs
articles on the classification of rights and wrongs seemed to closely follow Blackstone's classifica-
tory scheme at its highest levels. Compare Blackstone, Commentaries (cited in note 20) with
Langdell, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (cited in note 147) and Langdell, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 659 (cited in
note 147).
205. For a discussion of the relationship between Langdellian legal science and the histori-
cal school of jurisprudence, see note 152.
206. Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in
Higham and Conkin, eds., New Directions in American Intellectual History 116, 125 (cited in note
87). Ross continues: "Mhe Progressive intellectuals who followed are often seen to have
adopted evolutionary and historicist insights, or to be centrally concerned with the problem of
historical change." Id.
207. See Sebok, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 2081-83 (cited in note 23) (criticizing commentators who
have considered Langdell to be a natural law theorist).
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analogizing their jurisprudence to Aristotelian philosophy, as already
explained. Moreover, it was exactly the crucial distinction between
natural law and positivism that marked the antebellum period as
premodern and the postbellum era as modern.
A brief look at the jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
elucidates the historical position of Langdellian legal science. Holmes
was Langdell's contemporary and often is considered his first great
critic. Yet in many ways, the early Holmes was strongly aligned with
his Langdellian contemporaries.208 Most important, perhaps, Holmes
was a committed positivist. He declared that natural law jurists were
"naive,' '20 9 and as early as 1872, when explicitly discussing Austin's
positivist jurisprudence, Holmes wrote that "sovereignty is a form of
power, and the will of the sovereign is law, because he has power to
compel obedience or to punish disobedience, and for no other rea-
son.21o As a positivist, Holmes was fully engulfed in the modernist
wave of postbellum jurisprudence. Hence, contrary to the antebellum
faith in case precedents, Holmes (like Langdell) doubted and ques-
tioned cases, as revealed in the magnum opus of his early thought,
The Common Law, where he attempted to reconceptualize the system
of the common law. Holmes exhibited remarkable skepticism concern-
ing judicial opinions, arguing that they often obscure or deny the
actual bases for decision.2 1' Moreover, his effort to reconstruct the
common law revealed a typical modernist quest to establish founda-
tions. Indeed, Holmes claimed to rest the entire common law on one
basic principle. At the beginning of his two chapters on torts, Holmes
wrote: "[My] object ... is to discover whether there is any common
ground at the bottom of all liability in tort, and if so, what that ground
208. See Duxbury, Patterns of American Juriprudence at 46 & n.147 (cited in note 1)
(discussing commentators who have considered Holmes a pure anti-formalist and thus opposed to
Langdell). LaPiana writes: "[B]oth [Langdell and Holmes] were deeply situated in the
intellectual life of their age, and their ideas about law were far more alike than different. The
creation of a modern science of law was their common goal, and the separation of that science
from every other science was their common method." LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 169
(cited in note 2).
209. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 41 (1918).
210. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 6 Am. L. Rev. 723 (1872) (reviewing Frederick
Pollock, Law and Command, The Law Magazine and Review 189 (Butterworths, 1872)), re-
printed in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers
21, 22 (Central, 1973). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the
Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1870) (arguing that the question of who has sovereign power is a
question of fact). Later in his career, Holmes clearly and sharply separated the study of law from
morality. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-62
(1897) ("I emphasize the difference between law and morals:').
211. See, for example, Holmes, The Common Law at 35-36, 78 (cited in note 167) (arguing
that judges should openly acknowledge how they make law legislatively).
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is. Supposing the attempt to succeed, it will reveal the general princi-
ple of civil liability at common law."212 Holmes believed that he suc-
cessfully concluded his study by finding an ultimate foundational
principle: a (supposedly) objective standard of reasonableness best
exemplified by "the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and
reasonable prudence."213 In a sense, then, The Common Law was
deeply reductionistic-attempting to condense the entire common law
into one principle-and for that reason, it was highly abstract, formal,
and conceptual. In short, in many ways it strongly resembled a work
of Langdellian jurisprudence. Indeed, elsewhere, Holmes acknowl-
edged his admiration for writers, including Langdell, who brought
logical and conceptual order to the common law.214
Despite the similarities between Holmes and the Langdellians,
Holmes sat uncomfortably within their group.215 If the Langdellians,
as mentioned, failed in some ways to grasp the complete importance of
the movement away from premodernism, then perhaps Holmes more
thoroughly understood this transition. Holmes might even be consid-
ered the first American jurisprudent to shift fully to a modern histori-
cist sensibility, which he suggested in his most famous aphorism,
"[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."21 6 He
initially uttered this phrase in a critical review of Langdell's Summary
of Contracts and then repeated it on the first page of The Common
Law. Holmes continued in The Common Law:
212. Id. at 77.
213. Id. at 51. See id. at 111 (discussing the "ideal average prudent man").
214. See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 5 Am. L. Rev. 534 (1871)
(reviewing A.V. Dicey, A Treatise on the Rules for the Selection of the Parties to an Action
(William Maxwell & Sons, 1870)) ("Holmes, Dicey"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14
Am. L. Rev. 233 (1880) (reviewing C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,
with a Summary (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1880)).
Holmes, also like Langdell, recognized the significance of the transition from the common law
forms of action to code-pleading in the classification of the law. See, for example, Holmes, 5 Am.
L. Rev. at 13 (cited in note 210); Holmes, Dicey at 535 (cited in note 214).
215. Nicholas St. John Green, who was somewhat Holmesian in his jurisprudence, initially
taught at Harvard under Langdell, but left in protest against the overly theoretical approach of
the Langdellians. He went on to help start the law school at Boston University. See LaPiana,
Logic and Experience at 110-22 (cited in note 2). See, for example, Nicholas St. John Green,
Slander and Libel, 6 Am. L. Rev. 593 (1872) (reviewing John Townsend, A Treatise on the Wrongs
Called Slander and Libel, and On the Remedy by Civil Action for Those Wrongs (Baker, Voorhis,
2d ed. 1872)).
216. Holmes, The Common Law at 1 (cited in note 167); Holmes, 14 Am. L. Rev. at 234 (cited




The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book
of mathematics.
217
Thus, consistent with a modern historicist attitude, Holmes
believed that society progresses and that humans can control and
direct societal change. While this modern attitude might be hubristic,
it is not necessarily utopian. Unlike the Langdellians, Holmes never
conceived of the common law as a perfectly logical and conceptually
ordered system. "The truth is," Holmes asserted, "that the law is
always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever
adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old
ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off."2 18 In fact, Holmes, if anything, was more cynical than
utopian and hopeful.
19
The importance of this historicist sensibility partly explains the
distinctions between Langdellian and Holmesian jurisprudence. To
Langdellians, on the one hand, once the axiomatic principles of the
common law had been induced from the cases, the principles and
deductive logic became preeminent as the legal scientist conceptual-
ized a logically ordered system. To Holmes, on the other hand, while
logic was important, it never overshadowed experience. In 1870,
Holmes asserted that "although the general arrangment [of the com-
mon law] should be philosophical [or logical], compromises with prac-
tical convenience are highly proper.''220 Thus, in contrast to
Langdellian jurisprudence and most obviously echoing a historicist
217. Holmes, The Common Law at 1 (cited in note 167).
218. Id. at 36.
219. Later in his career, Holmes ruefully observed: "I believe that the world would be just
as well off if it lived under laws that differed from ours in many ways, and... that the claim of
our especial code to respect is simply that it exists, that it is the one to which we have become
accustomed, and not that it represents an eternal principle...." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 460 (1899).
220. Holmes, 5 Am. L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 210) In The Common Law, Holmes declared:
"[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative.... The very considerations which judges
most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws
all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community
concerned." Holmes, The Common Law at 35 (cited in note 167). In comparing Langdell and
Holmes, LaPiana writes: "The system [Langdell] extracted from the cases was too logical, too
concerned to draw distinctions and reconcile cases on grounds that existed only in his own mind.
Holmes, in contrast, felt himself to be firmly grounded in the reality of history, human nature,
and ways of the world." LaPiana, Logic and Experience at 121 (cited in note 2).
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approach, Holmes recommended that judges openly acknowledge their
law-making power and more consciously attempt to make law for the
good of society.221 In discussing the mailbox rule, for instance, while
Langdell had focused on a syllogistic proof, Holmes emphasized prac-
tical convenience.
222
In sum, Langdellians were committed first-stage modernists:
They sought to ground the common law system by primarily focusing
on axiomatic principles and deductive reason. Holmes, though, fit
only uneasily in this first stage: He willingly considered principles
and logic, but not at the expense of practical experience. Holmes, in
effect, planted the seeds for the second stage of legal modernism,
empiricism, when jurisprudents would focus primarily on experience
as an objective source of knowledge. This second stage would not fully
emerge until the early decades of the twentieth century when the
American legal realist movement stepped to the forefront of
jurisprudence.23 But even the realists shared much in common with
221. In The Common Law, Holmes wrote:
But hitherto this process [of judicial lawmaking] has been largely unconscious. It is
important, on that account, to bring to mind what the actual course of events has been.
If it were only to insist on a more conscious recognition of the legislative function of the
courts, as just explained, it would be useful ....
Holmes, The Common Law at 36 (cited in note 167). In Holmes's later writing, he explicitly
argued that judges have a "duty of weighing considerations of social advantage." Holmes, 10
Harv. L. Rev. at 467 (cited in note 210).
222. Langdell had argued, based on his syllogistic proof, that acceptance should be effective
only upon receipt; practical considerations and justice were beside the point. Whenever Langdell
did discuss such pragmatic concerns, he carefully circumscribed their importance, explaining
that they were not principles that could legitimately ground judicial decisions. See note 171 and
accompanying text (explaining Langdell's discussions of justice and practical considerations). In
stark contrast to Langdell's argument, Holmes asserted that convenience alone could be
determinative: "[In the mailbox situation] the doubt [is] whether the contract is complete at the
moment when the return promise is put into the post, or at the moment when it is received. If
convenience preponderates in favor of either view, that is a sufficient reason for its adoption."
Holmes, The Common Law at 305 (cited in note 167). Holmes then, as an ancillary matter,
added a logical argument in favor of deeming an acceptance effective upon dispatch, specifically
criticizing Langdell's syllogistic reasoning. Id. at 305-07. Hence, Holmes's and Langdel's
arguments were almost mirror images of each other: containing the same elements but in
reverse order. Whereas Langdell emphasized logic and only secondarily mentioned justice and
practical considerations (and only after deeming them irrelevant), Holmes emphasized justice
and practical concerns and only added a logical argument as a subordinate justification for his
position.
223. See Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought, in
Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Restrospective at 331-34 (cited in note 1). One can
reasonably argue that the later Holmes more fully revealed second-stage modernism. See, for
example, Holmes, 10 Harv. L. Rev. at 457(cited in note 210). By the end of the nineteenth
century, Holmes seemed to have relinquished the hope of conceptually reducing the common law
to a single principle. He more thoroughly accepted an external view of the legal system.
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the Langdellians, their modernist predecessors whom they overtly
reviled. As modernists-the realists, the Langdellians, and the
Holmesians-all rejected the antebellum premodernist commitment to
natural law principles as the foundation of the common law.
Consequently, they all joined in the modernist quest to identify a new
objective foundation for American jurisprudence.
